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# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATIONS  
IN EASTERN EUROPE:  
THE EFFICACY OF NORM DIFFUSION STRATEGIES OF  
THE EU AND NATO**

by

Corneliu Fuior

March 2007

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**DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE:  
THE EFFICACY OF NORM DIFFUSION STRATEGIES  
OF THE EU AND NATO**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS)**

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## **ABSTRACT**

In the process of international socialization, states are induced to adopt the constitutive norms and rules of the international community. This thesis examines the process of norm transfer by International Organizations (IOs), specifically the EU and NATO. Generally, international norms are diffused through IO enlargement or, as an alternative, through the partnership between the organization and non-member states.

The ultimate success of the socialization process depends on the strategies, mechanisms and tools that are used by each socializing agent. The effectiveness of IOs' norms diffusion in dealing with partners is greater when the organizations apply differentiated, multi-staged socialization strategies that imply various levels of conditionality and offer powerful incentives that encourage domestic transformation.

This study evaluates the effectiveness of the socialization strategies of the EU and NATO towards their East European neighbors given the fact that a prospective membership is not on the table. The main argument of this thesis is that, despite all positive achievements and results to date, the ENP as a norm diffusion mechanism is less effective than the PfP, and it could be improved by more actively applying the PfP's experience.



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## I. INTRODUCTION

The present study treats the manner in which norms of democratic governance have penetrated Central and Eastern Europe and what this process says to International Relations (IR) theory. Politics, society and the economy in the Euro-Atlantic world have become increasingly global. In its simplest sense globalization refers to “the widening, deepening and speeding up of global interconnectedness.”<sup>1</sup> Since globalism is a multidimensional phenomenon, scholars distinguish four equally important forms of globalism: economic, military, environmental, and social and cultural globalism.<sup>2</sup> Cultural globalism implies, among others, the process whereby norms are diffused by various institutions and actors of various kinds.

The contemporary world system is also characterized by being host to a plethora of international actors. The role of International Organizations (IO) as influential actors has increased. As a consequence, the IOs considerably affect the range of political options open to states’ domestic agents.

The transfer of norms by the IOs to Eastern Europe, particularly of the EU and NATO, forms the center of gravity of this study. International norms are often diffused through the enlargement of International Organizations. But any enlargement process has its limits and depends on the willingness, readiness and the integration capacity of an organization. Therefore, partnership between the organization and non-member states is an alternative mechanism for the transfer of norms.

The general goal of the thesis is to assess the effectiveness of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) as two substitute mechanisms of enlargement, through which the EU and NATO diffuse their norms to states that aspire to cooperation, affiliation or full membership. Particular

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<sup>1</sup> David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, “Rethinking Globalization,” in *The Global Transformations Reader*, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 67.

<sup>2</sup> Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So What?),” in *The Global Transformations Reader*, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 76.

attention in the present study will be paid to the ENP and PfP's impact on two East European countries – Moldova and Ukraine.

Although during the past two decades International Relations scholars have committed serious efforts to EU and NATO studies, certain areas in this field remain uncovered as events outrun the capacity of scholars to analyze them. This thesis is designed to fill such a gap in scholarship. First, the studies of the EU's and NATO's normative power refer mostly (with small exceptions) to the acceding and member countries, leaving aside the non-members, in particular the potential candidates in Eastern Europe. Second, there is still insufficient comparative research of the EU and NATO socialization strategies under conditions where the target states lack the most effective and attractive incentive – the membership perspectives. Finally, while the EU Neighborhood Policy is widely criticized by political analysts, there are still few academic studies that compare the EU partnership mechanisms and tools with those of NATO by applying the existing theoretical models of socialization.

Thus, this thesis will contribute to assessing the impact of EU and NATO policies towards the East European neighbors who currently do not have the immediate perspective of full membership. It will evaluate the effectiveness of EU and NATO socialization strategies and the role of these organizations to motivate and foster domestic reforms in Moldova and Ukraine. In identifying the causes of success and failure of such strategies, this thesis will compare the instruments and tools that are employed by ENP and PfP.

This topic is of crucial importance because the admission of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU in 2007 has marked out a “buffer” zone between the Euro-Atlantic liberal/pluralistic community and that of Russia. As a result, the struggle between ‘West’ and ‘East’ for “hearts and minds” in the East European countries will likely intensify. Therefore, the ultimate success of the socialization process depends on the strategies, mechanisms and tools that are used by each socializing agent. Since, at this stage, the EU and NATO do not offer to East European governments their main ‘carrot’ – the membership perspective – it can be argued that Russia is in a more advantageous position in maintaining its influence over the region due to several tools, among which the most

powerful are the energy supply, access to the Russian market and involvement in the settlement of the “frozen conflict” in the Trans-Dniester region (Moldova).

The main research question of this thesis is: How effective are the EU’s and NATO’s socialization strategies towards the East European neighbors (Moldova and Ukraine) given the fact that a membership perspective is not offered?

The analysis of the EU and NATO socialization strategies towards the non-members must consider the specific status of those countries. For example, the EU applies a common framework for countries with yet distant but highly potential future membership perspective (Eastern Europe and to some degree South Caucasus) and those who would hardly ever become EU members (North Africa, Middle East). Such a lack of differentiation does not motivate compliance with EU norms and standards in the potential candidate countries.

Thus, the first hypothesis of this thesis is that the effectiveness of IOs’ norms diffusion in dealing with partners is greater when the organizations apply differentiated, multi-staged socialization strategies that offer variable tools and imply various levels of conditionality. Thus, the target governments may choose the level of compliance with organizations’ rules depending on state interests and goals and domestic power costs. At the same time, the IOs’ socialization policy better reflects the progress achieved by the target states.

Another distinctive aspect of the ENP is that the EU is predominantly using the rationalist approach to norm diffusion, applying strong political conditionality without offering its main reward – the membership perspectives. This fact weakens the credibility of the EU policy. Successful socialization depends on the quality of alternative incentives. Thus, the second hypothesis is that the incentives offered by the International Organizations to potential candidates may be less attractive than membership but need to be strong enough to encourage serious transformation in order to keep the potential future membership perspective open or, better, improve its prospects. In this respect NATO proves to be more successful.

The main argument of this thesis is that, despite all positive achievements and results to date, the ENP as a norm diffusion mechanism is less effective than the PfP. Although both mechanisms do not promise future membership, the ENP's incentives and rewards are not powerful and credible enough to substantially trigger the target governments to adopt the EU rules, which is necessary in order to draw the East European countries closer to the *acquis communautaire*.

It can be argued that the European neighborhood agenda and the EU rules are more complex and wider than those of NATO, which is mainly focused on reforming the defense and security sector. Nevertheless, this paper will argue that the EU, though initiating the ENP much later than NATO launched the Partnership for Peace, did not consider the almost ten-year instruments and tools that have already demonstrated their effectiveness.

Therefore, this research suggests that the EU should introduce new elements in the ENP, analogous to those of NATO, which would offer a higher degree of interaction and integration between the EU and its Eastern neighbors. This would increase the effectiveness of the EU's socialization strategy. It would still not grant the membership perspective, but already substantially reward an ENP country that is successfully transforming, thus facilitating compliance with the EU's norms and rules and fostering the arduous transformation process.

This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter I gives a brief introduction to the content of this thesis. Chapter II provides the theoretical framework for further empirical analysis. It will focus on the concept of international norms, their emergence, internalization and diffusion by the agents of socialization. Then, the chapter will present the sociological approach to International Organizations as representatives of a community of states and their ability to transfer global norms through enlargement and partnership. In particular, EU and NATO will be considered. The rationalist and constructivist models of socialization diffusion will be presented.

Chapter III will focus on the EU as a socializing agent. It will present the evolution of the ENP, its mechanisms and tools. The analytical part of the chapter will

assess the results of the application of the ENP on Moldova and Ukraine. The same structure will be used in Chapter IV in describing NATO's socializing strategy. It will consider PfP as the key norm diffusion mechanism used in relation to non-member states. The chapter will also evaluate the effectiveness of the PfP's tools and instruments.

Based on the results of research, Chapter V will present a comparative analysis of the socialization strategies of both organizations by pointing to the causes of unsuccessful experiences. This thesis ends with final conclusions in Chapter VI.

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## II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Traditionally the field of International Relations was divided among the protagonists of the rational theories – realism and institutionalism – and their mainstream approaches, neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Realists see the international system as anarchy in which self-interested and rational actors – sovereign states – are in an endless struggle to guard security or to maximize their power.<sup>3</sup> On the other side of the spectrum scholars of the liberal tradition, though agreeing that the international system is anarchic, argued that states are eager to solve conflicts through cooperation. They share the realist assumption about the prevalence of rationalism in states' decisions. However, institutionalists argue that cooperation is possible even in an anarchic self-help system where the fear of cheating and relative gains concerns impede cooperation. Neo-liberals have developed the “democratic peace” concept according to which democracies do not fight one another, thus partly overcoming the adverse effects of the security dilemma.<sup>4</sup>

Although both paradigms have many divergences, they assumed that states have “innate and fixed interests and are constrained in their ability to further those interests because of material forces such as geography, technology and distribution of power.”<sup>5</sup> The lack of an ideational and normative approach to international politics, evident in the attempts to explain the end of the Cold War, gave birth in early 1990s to a new theoretical paradigm in the IR arena – social constructivism.

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<sup>3</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973); Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979); John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001); Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics” *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring, 1992); Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate,” *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994).

<sup>4</sup> Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001); Held and McGrew, eds., *The Global Transformation Reader*; J. L. Richardson, “Contending Liberalisms: Past and Present,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 1 (1997).

<sup>5</sup> Michael Barnett, “Social Constructivism,” in *Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: University Press, 2005), 252.



Constructivists suggest that the world system is an international community which is socially constructed. As noted by Adler, although constructivists are divided concerning some serious issues, they generally agree upon two important understandings: “*the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality.*”<sup>6</sup> In contrast to both rational paradigms, which emphasize the role of material factors and rational choice, constructivists build their assumptions on sociological theory, asking for greater focus on “ideational forces such as ideas, knowledge, norms and rules in order to deepen our interpretation of world politics.”<sup>7</sup> They attempt to open up these boxes, emphasizing that “state interests emerge from and are endogenous to interaction with structures,”<sup>8</sup> when both sides are mutually constituted or, in other words, ‘socially constructed’.

The viability of constructivists’ key concepts was widely recognized and today the main debate in the IR takes place between Rationalism and Constructivism. Constructivists have spent much energy explaining the importance of norms.<sup>9</sup> They have analyzed how international norms affect domestic policies and explained the differences in norms’ impact. Thus, scholars seek to answer the question: How does the international community contribute to (re)shaping states’ domestic policies and structures and why do norms in some cases have a greater impact on state interests than in others?

This thesis will take up this debate. It will specifically look through the prism of the rationalist-constructivist discussion at such problems as the norm diffusion by IOs. This chapter will focus particularly on the concept of norms, their role in IR theory and their impact on states’ domestic policies, as well as the role of IOs in the norm diffusion process. Before discussing the mechanisms of norm diffusion and the role of international

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<sup>6</sup> Emanuel Adler, “Constructivism and International Relations,” in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2002), 95. Emphasis added by the author.

<sup>7</sup> Michael Barnett, “Social Constructivism,” 252.

<sup>8</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (January 1998): 326.

<sup>9</sup> Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998).

organization in this process, it is necessary to look at the basics of normative theory – the emergence of international norms, their institutionalization within the IOs and the mechanisms through which the international actors socialize the target states. The next subchapter will describe some of the key concepts developed in the literature.

#### **A. INTERNATIONAL NORMS IN IR LITERATURE**

IR scholars differ in regards to the importance they attribute to norms in international relations. The debated topics include the origin of norms and causes of their change, as well as the impact that norms have on other actors' behavior. Realists deny norms' causal effect, while liberals consider the influence of norms in some issue-areas. Some supporters of 'regime theory' argue that norms, having a material base, "serve a regulative function, helping actors with given interests maximize utility."<sup>10</sup>

The constructivist approach goes further. It sees norms as standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.<sup>11</sup> Due to their ideational origin, norms may be compared with values, because both norms and values are interrelated with identity. However, whereas a value "refers to a desirable state of the world and defines the (ultimate) *ends* of action, a norm refers to the desirable behavior of actors and defines the appropriate *means* of action" which are used in order to achieve those ends.<sup>12</sup>

IR scholars generally agree that norms may have constitutive, regulative, evaluative/prescriptive, or practical effects on states. 'Constitutive' norms define identities and create new actors and interests. They specify "what actions will cause relevant others to recognize and validate a particular identity."<sup>13</sup> 'Regulative' norms prescribe proper behavior for the actors with a defined identity.<sup>14</sup> The other two categories of norms, though conceptualized, are practically neglected by academic

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<sup>10</sup> Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn," 327.

<sup>11</sup> Klotz, *Norms in International Relations*, 14; Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security*, 5; Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics," 891-893.

<sup>12</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 71. Emphasis added by authors.

<sup>13</sup> Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security*, 54.

<sup>14</sup> The protection of minority rights is an example of a regulative norm, while the state's sovereignty is a constitutive international norm.

literature.<sup>15</sup> When international norms are institutionalized within IOs or international regimes they are transformed into rules.<sup>16</sup>

Once the importance of norms in international relations was confirmed, scholars noticed that the impact of norm differs. Thus, for example, it was observed that some norms have a more powerful resonance than others. Or, in similar circumstances, a particular set of norms promoted by the same socializing agents affected one country but not on other. For example, democratic norms promoted by the EU and NATO were successfully transferred to Central and Eastern Europe, but not in Belarus. These puzzles stimulated research on processes and mechanisms through which norms are diffused and the factors which are responsible for the success or failure of the norm diffusion process.

A valuable contribution to the study of norm effects was offered by Finnemore and Sikkink, who developed the concept of a norm's "life cycle", according to which the norm influence occurs through a three stage process. It starts with "norm emergence"; continues with the norm acceptance process, termed as "norm cascade"; and ends with the norm "internalization". The first two stages are separated by a "tipping point" at which the norm is adopted by a "critical mass of relevant state actors".<sup>17</sup> Figure 1 depicts a norm life cycle.




Figure 1. Norm Life Cycle (Finnemore and Sikkink, 896)

<sup>15</sup> See, for example, the comments in Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security*, 5, fn. 12.

<sup>16</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, *International Socialization in Europe: European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 3.

<sup>17</sup> Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics," 895.

Finnemore and Sikkink argue that the changes at each stage are characterized by different actors, motives, and mechanisms of influence. These factors may have international or domestic origins: “multilateral institutional memberships, bilateral persuasion of learning, elite changes, domestic coalition building, and more dramatic domestic social transformation”.<sup>18</sup>

Scholars have realized that for better understanding of norms’ impact, the norm diffusion process needs more attention. In general terms, the diffusion of norms may be described as a struggle for hearts and minds. Diffusion means a “transfer or transmission of objects, processes, ideas and information from one population or region to another” or a communication of an innovation “through certain channels over time among members of a social system.”<sup>19</sup>

The academic literature distinguishes between “bottom-up” and “top-down” diffusion mechanisms. In the first case the main role is played by non-state actors and policy networks. The decision-makers are induced through mobilization and coercion to change state policy. While in the “bottom-up” mechanism norms are internalized through societal pressure on the elites, in the “top-down” process elite decision-makers are the main agents of norm diffusion. The role of political pressure is less and international norms are adopted mainly through social learning.<sup>20</sup>

For a new norm to emerge, two important elements are necessary: “norm entrepreneurs and organizational platforms from which the entrepreneurs act.”<sup>21</sup> Norm entrepreneurs act as agents who build the new norm. They understand what kind of behavior is appropriate or desirable in their community and construct “cognitive frames” through which the new norm will be ‘interpreted’ to the society.<sup>22</sup> According to Barnett,

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<sup>18</sup> Klotz, *Norms in International Relations*, 32.

<sup>19</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” *International Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (March 1999): 85.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 88.

<sup>21</sup> Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 896.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 897. For a deeper analysis of the role of “cognitive frames” see Rodger A. Payne, “Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction,” *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 1 (2001).

frames help actors to “fix meanings, organize experience, alert others that their interests and possibly their identities are at stake, and propose solutions to ongoing problems.”<sup>23</sup>

The necessity of suitable frames is explained by the fact that the new norm does not enter a “normative vacuum”, but instead must compete with the existing norms and interests. As Checkel argues, because of “country-specific differences”, a norm will be more rapidly diffused when “a cultural match exists between a systemic norm and a target country”.<sup>24</sup> Checkel defines cultural match as “a situation where the prescriptions embodied in an international norm are convergent with domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, the legal system (constitutions, judicial codes, laws), and bureaucratic agencies (organizational ethos and administrative procedures).”<sup>25</sup> This definition implies that cultural match varies depending on issue-areas.

In cases when international norms completely resonate in a particular issue-area with domestic ones, the cultural match is “positive” (+). If the domestic realm does not contain significant barriers for a particular norm the match is “null” (0). Once international norms collide with established domestic practices and rules the match is “negative” (-).<sup>26</sup> In the latter case the constitutive or regulative effect of a norm is practically unattainable.

The second important element of norm emergence refers to organizational platforms, because they serve as a starting point and as a transfer mechanism for international actors. Although sometimes norm entrepreneurs may build distinct organizational platforms (e.g., Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)) or may use “transnational advocacy networks”, usually the best way is to act through International Organizations whose agendas are much broader and include several international norms.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Michael Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo,” *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 1 (1999): 25.

<sup>24</sup> Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity,” 87.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 899.

The joint efforts of norm entrepreneurs and IOs offer necessary support for state actors who promote the new norms domestically. Organizational platforms provide various instruments and tools for local entrepreneurs to proceed.<sup>28</sup> The more effective the tools are which the organizations employ the more influence the norm will have.

If the available tools are successfully applied, the new norm reaches the tipping point, when it is adopted by the “norm leaders” – a critical mass of persuaded actors within states.<sup>29</sup> According to Finnemore and Sikkink, the critical mass of states is reached when the new norm is adopted by at least one third of the total state system. It is also important which states are among the supporters. As the authors highlight, those states “without which the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised” have a critical impact on the adoption of the new norm.<sup>30</sup> Although at its first stage the new norm does not produce substantial change in the actor’s behavior, it creates the necessary premises for the future processes. Though the previous values and norms are still influential, they are more and more perceived as inappropriate by the growing number of people.

Norm entrepreneurs and organizational frameworks are critical “building blocks” establishing the “groundwork” for norm diffusion. The instruments and tools used by them change the perception of population and reduce the cultural gap between domestic and international norms. But their role is not limited only to this stage. As this thesis will highlight, both elements are no less important at the next stages. If initially their main task is to challenge the established normative realm of a state and to acquire like-minded supporters, further stages will require more transformative actions. Thus, the application of new instruments and tools becomes crucial.

### **1. International Socialization**

After the tipping point is reached, the norm enters its next stage – norm cascade – where the normative changes are more significant. International socialization is the dominant process at this stage. After the end of the Cold War rationalists and

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<sup>28</sup> Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 900.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 901.

constructivists have much debated the place of ‘international socialization’ in IR theory. While rational-choice institutionalism largely neglects the importance of the socialization process as well as the socializing agencies, the constructivists emphasize the role of ‘international and transnational organizations’ as main agents of socialization and develop relevant theoretical frameworks that explain the internalization of global norms.<sup>31</sup>

International socialization is a process in which “states are induced to adopt the constitutive norms and rules of the international community.”<sup>32</sup> A specific emphasis in this definition is put on the understanding of socialization not as an outcome, but as an open-ended process which is “*directed at or potentially leading to* rules adoption by the target state.”<sup>33</sup>

Studying the effect of the socialization process, scholars sought explanations for the puzzle that similar processes under similar external conditions have different socializing effects. Cultural gaps and limited power of norm entrepreneurs and organizational frameworks may partly explain the failure of norm diffusion. However, more factors seem to come into play.

In IR theory states are conceptualized as the main, but not the only, agents of socialization at the systemic level. Other agents are networks of norm entrepreneurs and International Organizations that pressure “targeted actors to adopt new policies and laws and to ratify treaties” and monitor the “compliance with international standards.”<sup>34</sup> Thus, states may play the dual role of norm promoters and norm receptors. This thesis, however, is investigating socialization of states by International Organizations. Thus, it will focus on how IOs’ policies induce states to accept new norms and rules.

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<sup>30</sup> Finnemore, and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 901.

<sup>31</sup> Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, *International Socialization*; Jeffery T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” *International Organizations* 59, no. 4 (Fall, 2005).

<sup>32</sup> Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, *International Socialization*, 2.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added by authors.

<sup>34</sup> Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 902.

A model developed by Flockhart has contributed a lot to the studies of state socialization.<sup>35</sup> According to this model the outcome of state socialization is determined mainly by a process of “self-other” categorization between all social groups. Identities were categorized in terms of the perception by a social group of a particular set of norms. Hierarchically, the range of identities varies from the ‘Other’ (defined as what the ‘Self’/‘We’ is *not* and whose norm set is seen as unacceptable) to the ‘Significant We’ (what “‘Self’/‘We’ admires and strive to become” and whose rules are perceived as appropriate).<sup>36</sup>

Flockhart has also divided the domestic structure into two social groups: state/elite and nation/people. She stresses that each group may differ in “self-other” categorization dynamics.<sup>37</sup> Depending on the orientation of each social group towards the agent of socialization, the states may be divided into four typical out-groups as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. ‘Significant We’ Orientation (adapted from Flockhart, 103)

	State/elite	Nation/people
<b>‘Significant We’ Values + norms</b>	Yes	Yes
	Yes	No
	No	Yes
	No	No

Note: ‘Yes’ means that the socializer is seen as ‘Significant We’ and its set of norms is perceived as appropriate; ‘No’ means that the socializer is seen as ‘Other’ and its normative structure is inappropriate.

As Flockhart suggested, “the introduction of the self- and other categorization processes as a key determinant and as the start of the socialization process” increase the explanatory significance of this model and help to account for “differences between

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<sup>35</sup> Trine Flockhart, “‘Complex Socialization’: A Framework for the Study of State Socialization,” *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 1 (2006). As author mentions, this model combines “social constructivist theories for the ideational change with the agent-level theories from social psychology, particularly Social Identity Theory (SIT) and associated self- and other categorization processes.”

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 94.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 89.



seemingly similar cases.”<sup>38</sup> Thus, the model allows evaluating the suitability of strategies and mechanisms of socialization in each particular case.

The academic literature on socialization highlights two basic strategies of socialization or, if put differently, logics of action: the logic of consequence and the logic of appropriateness.<sup>39</sup> In both cases the socialization process is driven by the agent of socialization, either an International Organization or an NGO. The first strategy follows the rationalist arguments and represents a result of bargains among self-interested and rationally calculating actors, stressing that the socializing agents use external rewards and sanctions to induce the target states to adopt the rules.<sup>40</sup> Given the political demands addressed by the IOs to the target governments, this strategy is also called “political conditionality”.<sup>41</sup> The success of this strategy is determined by the credibility of the incentives and the domestic power costs incurred by the target government which has to comply with the new norms. The domestic costs are influenced by the number of veto-players.<sup>42</sup>

The alternative strategy – the logic of appropriateness – is based on the constructivist arguments of socialization through “persuasion (rather than coercion) and “complex” learning (rather than behavioral adaptation)”.<sup>43</sup> The transfer of norms occurs through a social learning process that changes attitudes without employing material instruments.<sup>44</sup> Once the new rules are perceived as “natural, rightful, expected, and

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<sup>38</sup> Flockhart, “Complex Socialization,” 110.

<sup>39</sup> For a more detailed description of the logics of action see Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., *Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel *International Socialization*; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Logic of Appropriateness,” *ARENA Working Papers* WP 04/09 (September 2004).

<sup>40</sup> James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 948-952.

<sup>41</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., *Europeanization*, 2; Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, *International Socialization*, 7.

<sup>42</sup> George Tsebelis, *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

<sup>43</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, “The International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern Europe: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” *Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series* 5, no.28 (August 2005): 7.

<sup>44</sup> Flockhart, “Complex Socialization,” 97.

legitimate”, the target states are eager to comply.<sup>45</sup> In sum, as argued by scholars, when the new international norms and rules are legitimate and resonate with the domestic realm, and when national elites identify themselves with the agent of socialization, the norm transfer through the logic of appropriateness is likely to be successful.<sup>46</sup>

## **2. The Domestic Impact of International Norms**

IR scholars devoted significant attention to study the processes which occur in the domestic arena. Several authors argue that variations in the adoption of international norms at the national level are conditioned and may be explained by the level of domestic salience or legitimacy of a norm and by characteristics of the domestic context.<sup>47</sup>

The domestic salience of a norm is based on the belief “that domestic institutions are better than other alternatives and therefore deserve obedience.”<sup>48</sup> Before being adopted, a new norm is compared with the alternatives at the international and regional level. Thus, according to Finnemore and Sikkink, domestic legitimacy “is obviously important because it promotes compliance with government rules and laws.”<sup>49</sup>

The domestic receptiveness of a new norm also depends on the quality of international norms. For example, Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel point out that, as a minimal condition, the norms diffused by International Organizations “must be based on the organizational rules rather than mere *ad hoc* interests of the member states”.<sup>50</sup> Put differently, these norms must be “clearly defined, consensually shared, and consistently applied” among the IOs’ members.<sup>51</sup>

When a norm becomes salient, “its invocation by relevant actors legitimates a particular behavior or action, creating a *prima facie* obligation, and thereby calling into

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<sup>45</sup> James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Logic of Appropriateness,” 2.

<sup>46</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., *Europeanization*, 18-20.

<sup>47</sup> Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda,” *International Studies Review* 2, no.1 (Spring, 2000): 66.

<sup>48</sup> Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 903.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Schimmelfennig, “The International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern Europe,” 8.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

question or delegitimizing alternative choices.”<sup>52</sup> However, the mere consistence of state behavior with an international norm does not yet indicate that this particular norm is salient. In Checkel’s opinion, the domestic impact of an international norm may be observed through: (1) the appearance of the norm in domestic discourse; (2) changes (transformations) in the state’s domestic institutions; and (3) changes of the state’s policies. Since the changes and transformations in the institutions and policies are preceded by the changes in domestic discourse, the latter is the most important measure.<sup>53</sup>

A salient norm is widely accepted domestically or, as some scholars suggest, is ‘internalized’. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that an internalized norm achieves a “taken-for-granted” quality.<sup>54</sup> The conformance with such a norm is almost automatic. When a state “internalizes” a norm, it transforms the “rules of an international community into domestic rules that is, into domestic institutions and discourses that effectively govern domestic and foreign policy-making”.<sup>55</sup> Under such conditions, the conformity with the norms within the domestic realm is no more questioned and it becomes extremely hard to disobey them.

Scholars suggest that successful internalization of a norm may occur through professions, because rather than simply transfer the technical knowledge professional training “actively socializes people to value certain things above others.”<sup>56</sup> For example, NATO’s assistance to reform the defense and security sector in partner countries significantly contributed to the promotion of democratic civil-military relations within their societies.

This chapter has already emphasized several conditions, mechanisms and processes that have an impact on the norm diffusion processes. Respectively, these

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<sup>52</sup> Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda,” *International Studies Review* 2, no.1 (Spring 2000): 69.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 70-72.

<sup>54</sup> Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 904.

<sup>55</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 73.

<sup>56</sup> Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 905.

factors allow the internalization of a global norm into the domestic arena. Academic literature in this field highlights two other important factors, namely political rhetoric and domestic interests. Thus, the political rhetoric generates the domestic collective understanding of an international norm. The declarations of political leaders illustrate the involvement of a new norm's acceptance or rejection. From the point of view of domestic interests, those norms that support "important domestic material interests, whether economic or security," will be more easily internalized.<sup>57</sup>

In sum, the domestic structures predict through which mechanisms the international norms are transmitted to the national arena, while domestic norms, by shaping the preferences of key agents, predetermine the degree to which they resonate and have constitutive effect in particular states.<sup>58</sup>

### **3. International Organizations as Agents of Socialization**

The traditional state-centric approach of realism has led to the neglect or underestimation of the role of the EU and NATO as corporate actors. In response, institutionalists have rejected the state-centric approach and focused more attention on formal institutions and regimes. In particular sociological institutionalism, inspired by constructivism, often presents International Organizations as the main agents of socialization. The IOs are regarded as communities of states.<sup>59</sup> They are guided by the common rules of the community and act on their behalf.

Although different in their institutional set-up, both the EU and NATO are conceptualized as organizations embodying the transatlantic pluralistic security communities, defined by Adler and Barnett as a "transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change."<sup>60</sup> Some scholars propose to define the community more generally as a social group whose

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<sup>57</sup> Cortel and Davis, "Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms," 76-79.

<sup>58</sup> Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity," 91.

<sup>59</sup> Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 1 (February 1998).

<sup>60</sup> Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 30.

members share the same values and standards of behavior, that is, the same “culture” (though it may differ to some degree).<sup>61</sup>

Ideally, depending on their “depth of trust” and the “nature and degree of institutionalization of their governance system,” security communities may be categorized as “loosely coupled” and “tightly coupled” communities.<sup>62</sup> Both the EU and NATO are examples of a tightly coupled communities characterized by a highly institutionalized governance system (in the EU case to an even higher degree) and, despite some divergence, with such a profound trust among their members that one might speak of a common identity or ‘we-feeling’. Since both organizations are based on democratic values, the legitimacy of norms promoted by them is high.

The transatlantic security community is based on liberal principles, pursues liberal values and acts according to liberal norms, such as social pluralism, the rule of law, democratic political participation and representation, private property and a market-based economy, peaceful conflict management, and multilateralism.<sup>63</sup> These fundamental rules and norms have made the EU and NATO very attractive, especially in the post-Cold War period, for the newly established democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.

The community’s institutionalization is expressed in community organizations that “regulate community membership and act to realize the community values and to uphold the community norms”.<sup>64</sup> While rationalists see IOs as instruments “designed to help states to pursue their interests more efficiently”<sup>65</sup>, sociological institutionalists affirm that IOs are “autonomous and powerful actors” in their own right and may influence world politics “by establishing categories, fixing meanings, and diffusing

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<sup>61</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe*, 72.

<sup>62</sup> Adler and Barnett, “A Framework,” 30.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 78.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 72.

<sup>65</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Research,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 9, no. 4 (August 2002): 509.

norms”.<sup>66</sup> Thus, using their expertise and information, IOs regulate state behavior and shape state identities and interests.

IOs do not only represent their communities, but they also build them. The most common way community-building occurs is through enlargement of an organization. Moreover, through the pre-accession process IOs socialize the soon-to-be members. A number of studies examined the enlargement process focusing on normative and ideational aspects.<sup>67</sup>

Scholars see the IOs’ enlargement as one of the most efficient mechanisms of socialization. Once norms and rules are internalized within IOs, organizations tend to share their knowledge and to transmit to the target states the norms and models of good governance that are considered acceptable and legitimate.<sup>68</sup> On the other side, the states in transition to democracy seek the membership in IOs because of their willingness to become part of the community. To join the ‘club’ states must conform to the organization’s criteria. Thus, membership in the IOs helps national elites to “credibly commit to reform efforts by establishing a mechanism that increases the cost of deviating from these efforts and backsliding.”<sup>69</sup>

Recent studies have helped to broaden the analysis of the interaction between international and domestic politics. Some refer to the quality of the incentives provided by IOs for aspiring countries’ transformation and the impact of domestic costs; the role and the effectiveness of IOs’ conditionality during the socialization process; as well as the relationship between international pressure and national responses.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules of the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 34.

<sup>67</sup> Karin M. Fierke and Antje Wiener, “Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlargement,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, no.5 (December 1999); Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” in *International Organization*, 55, no.1 (Winter, 2001).

<sup>68</sup> Barnett and Finnemore, *Rules of the World*, 33; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Theorizing EU enlargement,” 503; Jeffrey W. Legro, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” *International Organization* 51, no. 1 (Winter, 1997).

<sup>69</sup> Eduard D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse, “Democratization and International Organizations,” *International Organization* 60, no. 1 (Winter, 2006).

<sup>70</sup> Jeffrey W. Legro, “Which Norms Matter?”; Frank Schimmelfennig, “European Neighborhood Policy: Political Conditionality and its Impact on Democracy in Non-Candidate Neighboring Countries.”

However, the writings largely focus on acceding states or on those that have reliable perspectives of accession. The effectiveness of the EU and NATO's norm diffusion process in relation to partners or neighbors lacking this clear perspective got less attention in academic literature. If focusing on these countries, scholars limit their analysis to one particular variable or one particular case.

Generally the EU and NATO are widely presented as successful normative agents. Nevertheless, some authors point out their failure in promoting democracy<sup>71</sup> and transparency.<sup>72</sup> Arguing that the accession to NATO "did not contribute much to democratization in the three East European states admitted in 1999", Dan Reiter proposes that in its approach to foster democratic transformation, the West "should rely on the European Union".<sup>73</sup> Alexandru Grigorescu argues that such organizations as NATO, the EU and the Council of Europe (CoE) "have been unsuccessful in transmitting transparency because this particular norm does not 'resonate' with the norms on which these IOs were founded".<sup>74</sup>

Although EU and NATO enlargement was covered by IR literature, until recently this domain suffered from a lack of comparative studies analyzing the relationship between the two processes. The bulk of previous writings was mainly descriptive or policy oriented and typically addressed single cases – "single enlargement rounds of single organizations, single member or accession countries, or even single policy areas in the enlargement process".<sup>75</sup> Such important topics as the pre-accession process and the impact of the IOs on the acceding countries were ignored. The literature on NATO

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Paper prepared for the EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference, Austin (March 31 – April 2, 2005); Frank Schimmelfennig, "Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe," *International Organization* 59, no. 4 (Fall 2005); Alexandra Gheciu, "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 'New Europe'," *International Organization* 59, no. 4 (Fall 2005).

<sup>71</sup> Dan Reiter, "Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy," *International Security* 25, no.4 (Spring 2001).

<sup>72</sup> Alexandru Grigorescu, "European Institutions and Unsuccessful Norm Transmission: The Case of Transparency," *International Politics*, 39 (December 2002).

<sup>73</sup> Reiter, "Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy," 42.

<sup>74</sup> Grigorescu, "European Institutions," 468.

<sup>75</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, "Theorizing EU enlargement," 501.

enlargement was focused predominantly on the impact of eastward enlargement in terms of promoting “greater peace and stability” in Europe.<sup>76</sup>

In the last few years the situation has changed. Recent studies on enlargement redirected the emphasis on more crucial theoretical questions. The IR literature presents a series of empirically tested theories and models focused predominantly on the role of “external players and external governance in domestic political and economical transformations”.<sup>77</sup>

In 2002, while anticipating the “big-bang” enlargement, the EU initiated the formulation of a new policy towards future neighbors. Some analysts came up with specific recommendations for the development of the EU “Eastern Dimension” oriented towards Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine.<sup>78</sup> Two years later this policy was formally conceptualized as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).<sup>79</sup> The new policy instrument was analyzed rigorously. But the main contributions remained predominantly descriptive or policy oriented.<sup>80</sup> Attempting to evaluate the EU’s policy impact on the transformation in neighboring countries, the authors came to the conclusion that as a norm diffusion mechanism the ENP has lots of lacunae. The lack of powerful and

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<sup>76</sup> Fierke and Wiener, “Constructing Institutional Interests,” 722.

<sup>77</sup> Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Sectoral Dynamics of EU Enlargement: Advocacy, Access and Alliances in a Composite Policy,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 9, no.4 (August 2002); Wade Jacoby, *The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Walter Mattli and Thomas Plümer, “The Demand-side Politics of EU Enlargement: Democracy and the Application for EU Membership,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 9, no.4 (August 2002).

<sup>78</sup> Catherine Guicherd, “The Enlarged EU’s Eastern Border: Integrating Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in the European Project,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Studies, S 20, June 2002, [http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get\\_document.php?asset\\_id=319](http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=319) [accessed January 15, 2007].

<sup>79</sup> “European neighborhood Policy: Strategy Paper,” *Communication from the Commission* (COM(2004)373 final, 12.5.2004), [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf) [accessed January 15, 2007].

<sup>80</sup> Hiski Haukkala and Arkady Moshes, “Beyond “Big Bang”: The Challenges of the EU’s Neighborhood Policy in the East,” (FIIA Report, 9/2004).



attractive incentives, the “heterogeneity” of the ENP’s members and the vagueness of the EU’s rewards’ perspectives are perceived to be the main causes of these shortcomings.<sup>81</sup>

The ENP may benefit from effective transatlantic cooperation. However, as mentioned by some commentators, although the EU and the US have many common or shared interests and their agendas are reinforcing each other, some factors may impede the transatlantic relationship. These are: different geographical, political, and economic “realities” in dealing with Eastern Europe; different policy agendas; and different approaches to democracy promotion, to mention just a few of them.<sup>82</sup>

Another important issue is that the divergence among the EU members’ approaches towards the ENP affects the legitimacy and resonance of the EU policy in neighboring countries. Thus, for example, Germany’s “Russia first” policy and France’s main focus on Mediterranean countries compete with the calls expressed by the new EU members to direct more support towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.<sup>83</sup> Such differences undermine the official EU rhetoric and decrease the likelihood of compliance of domestic actors in the ENP countries.

NATO’s normative mechanisms are still understudied. Although the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) proved to be an effective framework for domestic transformation in the defense and security sector of partner countries, academic literature is still lacking a comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis of this effect. Moreover, the possibility of analytical comparison between the ENP and PfP is not explored yet.

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<sup>81</sup> Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighborhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery,” Center for European Integration Studies, Discussion Paper, C 158 (2006), [http://www.zei.de/download/zei\\_dp/dp\\_c158Marchetti.pdf](http://www.zei.de/download/zei_dp/dp_c158Marchetti.pdf) [accessed December 21, 2006].

<sup>82</sup> Michael Baun, “The United States and European Neighborhood Policy,” (report prepared for the European Consortium for Political Research, 3<sup>rd</sup> Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Bilgi University, Istanbul September 21-23, 2006).

<sup>83</sup> More detailed on this issue in Marco Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnish, eds., “The New Neighborhood Policy of the European Union: Perspectives from the European Commission, France, Germany, Poland, Ukraine and Moldova,” *Foreign Policy in Dialogue* 6, no. 19 (2006); Grzegorz Gromadzki, Raimundas Lopata and Kristi Raik, “Friends or Family?: Finnish, Lithuanian and Polish perspectives on the EU’s policy towards Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova,” (FIIA Report, 12/2005); Iris Kempe, “From a European Neighborhood Policy toward a New *Ostpolitik* – The Potential Impact of German Policy,” *Center for Applied Policy Research (C.A.P.)*, Policy Analysis no. 3 (May 2006).

The academic literature presents two strategies of community-building and international socialization in which enlargement functions in different ways: ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ strategies. In the first case, socialization occurs from ‘within’ the community. Thus, the aspiring country is first admitted to an organization and then is taught the rules of the organization. When a community is pursuing an inclusive strategy, “a state is admitted to an international organization if it aspires to become a member of the international community the organization represents”.<sup>84</sup> Usually, the inclusive strategy is applied by those organizations which do not possess material incentives that can reinforce organizations’ conditionality. For example, the OSCE is the most inclusive organization. Due to the lack of powerful material incentives, the organization follows the logic of appropriateness and relies mainly on persuasion and social reinforcement.<sup>85</sup>

When the IO is applying the ‘exclusive’ strategy, the community’s constitutive norms and values are communicated to the outsider. Once a state has internalized the constitutive values and norms of the international community it is admitted to the IO.<sup>86</sup> Although scholars stress that the EU and NATO rely predominantly on the exclusive strategy of socialization, some examples contradict this argument.<sup>87</sup> Thus, sometimes IOs deviate from the “ideal types” and lower their thresholds to deal with complex realities.

As argued in the academic literature, the exclusive strategy is based on the reinforcement by reward, punishment and support.<sup>88</sup> The reinforcement by reward and punishment allows the IOs to promote a strong political conditionality. The more tangible are the incentives, and the higher the benefits, the more likely it is that the target states will comply.<sup>89</sup> If a targeted state acknowledges that in case of non-compliance with the organization’s rules the rewards will be withheld, it is more likely that the decision-

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<sup>84</sup> Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe*, 74.

<sup>85</sup> Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, *International Socialization*, 34.

<sup>86</sup> Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe*, 75.

<sup>87</sup> The European Community accepted Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986 and NATO offered membership to Spain in 1982 when the new members did not fully correspond to the organizations’ requirements and criteria. The accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in 2007 is another example of a ‘mixed’ strategy.

<sup>88</sup> Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, *International Socialization*, 36-41.

<sup>89</sup> Schimmelfennig, “The International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern Europe,” 4.

makers will reconsider the policies. At the same time, the IO's promises must be credible. This refers to rewards as well as to punishment. Generally, the threat of expulsion from a program has a high degree of credibility. The states that fail to fulfill the political conditions set by the IO may be denied of any assistance or support (reinforcement by support).<sup>90</sup> Although the reinforcement by rewards and punishment seems to be effective, recent empirical studies have demonstrated that this is not always the case.<sup>91</sup>

As previously mentioned, enlargement is one of the most effective socialization mechanisms. However, any enlargement process has its limits and depends on the willingness, readiness and the integration capacity of the organization. Therefore, when an IO reaches the level of "enlargement fatigue", it still may transfer its norms using alternative mechanisms, for example, through various partnerships with non-member states. But in this case, the partner states lack the critical incentive for their efforts – the perspective of membership in the organization. As a consequence, the IO's policies have to muster all available "means", strategies, instruments and tools, which might lead to desirable "ends". The incentives which are offered to the target governments must be attractive enough to overcome the domestic power costs without affecting the IO's structures and activity. This thesis will examine how this problem was solved by the EU and NATO.

## **B. RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES**

### **1. Research Design**

This research will employ both the rationalist and the constructivist perspective, applying two alternative models of socialization to both the ENP and PfP.

#### ***a. The Rationalist Perspective (External Incentives Model)***

This model follows the logic of consequence. The IO's rules are set as conditions to the targeted countries. The rewards are promised in advance and may consist of assistance programs; closer ties and cooperation; deeper integration; and full

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<sup>90</sup> Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, *International Socialization*, 37

<sup>91</sup> Ibid. The case of Belarus demonstrated that the reinforcement by punishment did not contribute to the changes in domestic policies. The case of Turkey shows that the reinforcement by rewards is also not always effective.

membership. Upon the fulfillment of the conditions set by the organization, the country may receive these rewards. According to the external incentives model a government adopts IO's rules if the benefits of IO's rewards are higher than the domestic adoption costs. The success of socialization depends on the size and speed of rewards. The more tangible and material the incentives are, and the higher the benefits are, the more likely it is that the target states will comply. At the same time, the IO's promises must be credible. Generally, the threat of expulsion from a program has a high degree of credibility.<sup>92</sup>

"Domestic costs" is another factor that determines if a state will accept or reject the conditions. Domestic costs reflect "political or power costs of governments".<sup>93</sup> The acceptance of liberal democratic norms automatically limits the power of governments. In addition, the domestic costs of compliance with norms are also affected by the role and the number of "veto-players". Thus, the adoption of norms by national elites depends on four sets of factors: the determinacy of conditions; the size and speed of rewards; their credibility and conditionality; and the veto players and adoption costs.<sup>94</sup>

In summary, according to the external incentives model the likelihood of a state's compliance with the IO's norms increases when the IO's institutional demands are conditioned; when the conditionality is clear and plausible; when conditionality is credible (when domestic actors are convinced that promised IO's threats and rewards will be delivered on); when domestic political and economic costs of adoption are low; and when the number of domestic veto players is low.<sup>95</sup>

***b. The Constructivist Perspective (Social Learning Model)***

This alternative model is driven by the logic of appropriateness, emphasizing the identification of a particular country with an IO. The whole process of norms and rules transfer is characterized by "persuasion (rather than coercion) and "complex" learning (rather than behavioral adaptation)".<sup>96</sup> According to the social

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<sup>92</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization*, 11-12.

<sup>93</sup> Schimmelfennig, "The International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern Europe," 4-6.

<sup>94</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization*, 10-17.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 16-17.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

learning model “a government will comply with the norms of an organization if it is persuaded of their appropriateness”.<sup>97</sup> There are three sets of factors through which an IO empowers national societal actors: the legitimacy of norms and process, identity and resonance. Thus, the social learning model highlights that the effectiveness of IO’s socialization strategy is affected by the legitimacy of the IO-supported institutions; the identification of national policy-makers and society with the liberal community; and the resonance of the IO’s norms within the target state.<sup>98</sup> Table 2 summarizes all the influential factors and the hypotheses developed within each of these models.

Table 2. The Influential Factors of the Alternative Strategies of Socialization and Developed Hypotheses<sup>99</sup>

Models	Determinant factors	Hypotheses <i>The adoption of rules is more likely when</i>
<b>External incentives model</b> (Logic of consequence)	Determinacy of conditions	The IO attaches clear conditionality to institutional demands
	Size and speed of rewards	The size and speed of rewards is adequate
	Credibility of conditionality	IO’s conditionality is credible
	Veto players and adoption costs	Domestic and political costs of adoption as well as the number of domestic veto players are low
<b>Social learning model</b> (Logic of appropriateness)	Legitimacy of rules and process	The legitimacy of the rules increases
	Identity	National elites identify themselves with the IO
	Resonance	IO-supported rules encounter domestic resonance

## 2. Methodology

The empirical part of this thesis will present a comparative longitudinal and cross-organizational policy case study. Since Moldova and Ukraine are not candidates for membership in one of the organizations, the full EU/NATO conditionality is not applicable. Nevertheless, one of the goals of this thesis is to evaluate the benefits of conditionality and strategic socialization at this still early stage of the countries’

<sup>97</sup> Schimmelfennig, “The International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern Europe,” 7.

<sup>98</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization*, 18-20.

<sup>99</sup> The table summarizes the findings presented in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization*, 10-20.

relationship with these IOs. This will allow one to draw conclusions on the conditions and mechanisms of norm diffusion in Eastern Europe.

The analysis will focus on the instruments and ‘tools’ provided by ENP and PfP to stimulate domestic transformations. The comparative chapter will evaluate the effectiveness of both mechanisms with regard to Moldova and Ukraine. This case selection is motivated by several factors. First, both countries have the same formal relationship with both the EU and NATO through the ENP and, respectively, the PfP. The differences in the intensity of cooperation will help to determine the advantages and disadvantages of both mechanisms. Second, among all of the current ENP members these countries have the most likely perspectives to join the EU, simply because they are part of what is geographically considered the European continent.<sup>100</sup> Third, since this region belonged to the former Soviet Union, it continues to be a terrain of struggle for influence between the West and Russia. Thus, attempts of the EU and NATO at norm diffusion collide with a strong impetus by Russia to diffuse its own quite different norms in the region.

The impact of the EU’s and NATO’s socialization strategies will be measured from three perspectives: formal, behavioral and communicative or discursive. From a formal point of view, the compliance with the EU and NATO rules may be observed when a state (1) transposes these rules into national law and (2) establishes formal institutions and procedures in line with the EU and NATO demands. From a behavioral perspective, rule-conforming behavior attests to the adoption of rules. The discursive conception of norms indicates compliance with rules by observing changes in domestic discourse (see Table 3).<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Belarus is also part of this group. However due to the Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime the country’s chances to join the EU are currently low.

<sup>101</sup> Schimelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization*, 8.

Table 3. The Forms of Compliance with EU/NATO Norms (adopted from Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization*, 8)

Formal conception	Behavioral conception	Communicative or discursive conception
Transposition of the EU and NATO rules into national law	The extent to which behavior is rule-conforming	Incorporation of a EU/NATO rule as a positive reference into discourse among domestic actors
Establishment of formal institutions and procedures in line with EU and NATO rules		

Finally, the data for each organization will be summarized in the following matrix (Table 4).

Table 4. Overview of the Case Study Conditions and Results

Influential factors		EU (ENP)	NATO (PfP)
<b>Rationalist perspective</b> ( <i>External incentives model</i> )	Determinacy of conditions		
	Size and speed of rewards		
	Credibility of conditionality		
	Veto players and adoption costs		
<b>Constructivist perspective</b> ( <i>Social learning model</i> )	Legitimacy of norms and process		
	Identity		
	Resonance		

In conclusion, this thesis will lead to comparing the effectiveness of the EU/NATO norm diffusion mechanisms, emphasizing the shortcomings of the ENP compared with the PfP.

The sources used for this thesis include basic EU and NATO documents; official documents from Moldova and Ukraine and their national and bilateral programs with both organizations; statistical data and opinion polls provided by the *Eurobarometer*, *Freedom House*, and other national and international analytical centers and think-tanks; as well as previous theoretical and empirical studies and policy papers. Finally, policy analyses and evaluations of these processes will be used for the research.

### **III. THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY**

As previously mentioned, enlargement is the most effective, though not the only mechanism of norm diffusion of IOs. However, the IOs' readiness and integration capacity limits the enlargement process. Thus, IOs continue to socialize the non-member countries in addition through various partnership mechanisms. This chapter will focus on the effectiveness of the EU socialization policies and strategies towards those states to which the membership perspective has not been granted. The first subchapter will briefly describe the origins, motives and principles of the European Neighborhood Policy, while the second will evaluate the effectiveness of this policy from the rationalist and constructivist perspectives. The analysis will comprise the ENP in general as well as its particular impact on the East European neighbors – Moldova and Ukraine.

#### **A. THE ENP – ORIGINS, RATIONALE AND PRINCIPLES**

After the decision on the “Big-Bang” enlargement of 2004 had been made, the question of the relationship with new neighbors came up among the top priorities of the EU agenda. Strategically, the EU policy towards the neighbors was driven mainly by security concerns, followed by economic interests and democracy export. The EU Security Strategy (ESS) reflects the key issue of stability transfer to the EU neighborhood: “Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.”<sup>102</sup>

The ESS mentions that the main challenges faced by the EU and its neighbors come from poverty, insecurity, violent or ‘frozen’ conflicts, population explosions, resource shortages and failures of governance. Consequently, this leads to an increase of illegal immigration, the rise of organized crime, and the spread of conflicts fueled by extremist and ethnic movements. All together, these challenges have a negative impact on

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<sup>102</sup> “A Secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy,” (document proposed by Javier Solana and adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the European Council in Brussels on 12 December 2003), <http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf> [accessed December 12, 2006].



the security of the EU as much as on the entire European continent. Therefore, the promotion of stability, security and prosperity in the EU's neighborhood – a zone where its influence is greatest – became a 'flagship' of the EU's foreign policy. From the practical point of view, the goal for the ENP was to address weaknesses and shortcomings of the existing EU framework and documents.<sup>103</sup>

The formulation of a new EU policy towards the neighbors was initiated in 2002. One year later, the EU intentions were officially formalized. The EU Communication on "Wider Europe" stresses that the EU should develop a zone of peace, stability and prosperity and a friendly neighborhood – a "ring of friends"<sup>104</sup> – founded on common values and deeper integration.<sup>105</sup> In 2004, this policy received its official name – the European Neighborhood Policy.<sup>106</sup> Being targeted initially only on Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, the policy soon encompassed Russia and the countries of the Barcelona Process, with the final inclusion in 2004 of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Currently, the ENP includes most of the countries with which the EU shares land or maritime borders.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Rutger Wissels, "The Development of the European Neighborhood Policy," in "The New Neighborhood Policy of the European Union: Perspectives from the European Commission, France, Germany, Poland, Ukraine and Moldova," ed. Marco Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnish, *Foreign Policy in Dialogue* 6, issue 19 (2006), 8. The EU has currently two types of agreements which were signed before the initiation of the ENP. Thus, with East European neighbors the EU is cooperating on the basis of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA), while with the Mediterranean Partners on the basis of Association Agreements (AA). Although these agreements comprise the basic elements of the EU's policy such as political dialogue and economic cooperation, they differ not only in their titles, but also in their content and are not adapted to the circumstances and priorities set in the EU's new agenda. For more information on PCAs and AAs see the official EU web-site at [http://europa.eu/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/index_en.htm).

<sup>104</sup> Romano Prodi, "A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability," speech at the 6<sup>th</sup> ECSA-World Conference (Brussels, 5-6 December 2002), 4. [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/news/prodi/sp02\\_619.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/news/prodi/sp02_619.htm) [accessed December 14, 2006].

<sup>105</sup> "Wider Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours," Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (COM(2003)104 final, 11.3.2003), [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03\\_104\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf) [accessed December 12, 2006].

<sup>106</sup> "European Neighborhood Policy: Strategy Paper," Communication from the Commission (COM(2004)373 final, 12.5.2004), [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf) [accessed December 12, 2006].

<sup>107</sup> ENP countries: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.

Despite its inclusion in the ENP, Russia, as the largest EU neighbor, insisted on a bilateral relationship that would emphasize its ‘special’ status. Thus, in 2004 the EU and Russia signed the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership that intensified and organized cooperation in four common spaces: economic; freedom, internal security and justice; external security; and research, education and culture.<sup>108</sup> Belarus, Libya and Syria, though potentially covered by the ENP, do not have contractual relations with the EU. Thus, they do not fulfill the preconditions for benefiting from this policy.

The main objectives of the ENP are the promotion of reform, the rule of law, stable democracies, and prosperity, security and stability in the EU’s neighborhood. Through an intensified political dialogue and deeper economic relationship, based on shared values and common interests, the EU aims to share with its neighbors the enlargement’s benefits and foster domestic transformation in neighboring countries.

The new EU policy was initiated within the Directorate General (DG) Enlargement. Later, the EU created a new DG External Relations and Neighborhood Policy and transferred there several professionals who previously were responsible for enlargement.<sup>109</sup> Relying strongly on the enlargement experience and involving the ‘enlargement’ staff, the EU has applied to the ENP the socialization strategies similar to those used in its relations with the acceding countries. However, and this is a significant difference, from the beginning there were no intentions of the EU to offer any membership perspective to these neighbors. As Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, stated in 2002, the EU has “to be prepared to offer more than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the latter,” or put differently, to share with the neighbors “everything but institutions.”<sup>110</sup> Thus, from its start the ENP was lacking the most attractive incentive, indeed the ‘pivotal’ factor of the IOs’ socializing strategies. Notwithstanding, the ENP contained several attractive ‘rewards’. The European Union

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<sup>108</sup> European Commission, [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/russia/intro/index.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm) [accessed December 6, 2006].

<sup>109</sup> Amicai Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Neighborhood Policy Achieve Compliance?” Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law (CDDRL), Working Paper No. 68 (August 2006), 397.

<sup>110</sup> Prodi, “A Wider Europe”, 7.

expressed the intention to offer to its neighbors a kind of ‘privileged’ partnership: financial assistance; the perspective of trade and economic integration with the EU; as well as the facilitation of migration and movement for ENP countries’ citizens.<sup>111</sup>

The relations between the EU and its neighbors are governed by contractual agreements. On their basis, and in order to address the particular needs of the individual partners, the European Commission drafts Individual Reports. The reports regularly assess the current state of relations as well as political, social and economic developments and identify the set of issues that have to be addressed. By doing so, the reports serve as a basis for specific Action Plans that are worked out in cooperation with the respective countries. Progress in meeting the objectives is monitored in association or partnership councils established by the existing agreements. These plans finally constitute the points of reference for concrete implementation and assistance.

The ENP Action Plans set norms and standards that a neighbor should adopt, indicating the objectives and priorities for action.<sup>112</sup> They contain specific political, economic and cultural provisions, drawing on all three pillars of the EU.<sup>113</sup> In particular, the Action Plans cover such areas as:

1. Political dialogue and reform;
2. Economic and social reform;
3. Trade, market and regulatory reform;
4. Cooperation on issues relating to justice, freedom and security;
5. Cooperation and reform in sectors such as transport, energy, information society, environment, science and research;
6. “People-to-people” contacts such as civil society, education, public health, cultural cooperation.

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<sup>111</sup> “European Neighborhood Policy: Strategy Paper,” 3.

<sup>112</sup> In 2004 the EU Commission drafted the first seven Action Plans (with Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, and Ukraine).

<sup>113</sup> The three EU pillars are: European Communities (EC), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC), [http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/eu\\_pillars\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/eu_pillars_en.htm) [accessed December 12, 2006].

Despite the common ENP framework and structure, the Action Plans are differentiating, individualized and adapted to the particular circumstances and needs of each partner. For example, one of the key objectives of the EU–Moldova Action Plan is the EU support in settling the Transnistrian conflict.<sup>114</sup> The ownership of a Plan is ‘jointly’ shared between the EU and the neighbor. The current state of relations between the EU and the ENP countries is presented below in Table 5.

Table 5. Current State of Relations Between EU and ENP Countries (Adapted from Marchetti, “The European Neighborhood Policy,” 9, <http://europa.eu.int>).

ENP Countries	Contractual basis			Country Report	Action Plan	
	type	Agreed	In force		agreed	in force
Algeria	AA	12/2001	09/2005	-	-	-
Armenia	PCA	04/1996	07/1999	03/2005	10/2006	11/2006
Azerbaijan	PCA	04/1996	07/1999	03/2005	10/2006	11/2006
Belarus	PCA	03/1995	-	-	-	-
Egypt	AA	06/2001	06/2004	03/2005	-	-
Georgia	PCA	04/1996	07/1999	03/2005	10/2006	11/2006
Israel	AA	11/1995	06/2000	05/2004	12/2004	04/2005
Jordan	AA	11/1997	05/2002	05/2004	12/2004	06/2005
Lebanon	AA	06/2002	04/2006	03/2005	07/2006	01/2007
Libya	-	-	-	-	-	-
Moldova	PCA	11/1994	07/1998	05/2004	12/2004	02/2005
Morocco	AA	02/1996	03/2000	05/2004	12/2004	07/2005
Palestinian Authority	AA*	02/1997*	07/1997*	05/2004	12/2004	05/2005
Syria	AA	10/2004	-	-	-	-
Tunisia	AA	07/1995	03/1998	05/2004	12/2004	07/2005
Ukraine	PCA	06/1994	03/1998	05/2004	12/2004	02/2005

<sup>114</sup> EU – Moldova Action Plan, [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action\\_plans/moldova\\_com\\_proposal\\_enp\\_ap\\_2004\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/moldova_com_proposal_enp_ap_2004_en.pdf) [accessed December 12, 2006].

Note: PCA – Partnership and Cooperation Agreement; AA – Association Agreement; \* - Interim Agreement.

As previously stated, financial and technical assistance and the perspective of trade and market integration with the EU are the key incentives that may be offered to neighbors. In the context of a wider reform of the European Commission's financial assistance, beginning in 2007 the ENP is employing a single European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) which has replaced all previous programs such as MEDA<sup>115</sup>, Tacis<sup>116</sup> and other existing programs. The main feature of the new instrument is that it is more flexible than its predecessors and is focusing specifically on cross-border cooperation and related activities. The preferential trading relationship – another 'carrot' of the ENP – is aimed to stimulate trade in new areas and provide opportunities for increased investment and self-sustaining economic growth.<sup>117</sup> From this perspective it may be argued that for the Eastern neighbors the access to the EU's Internal Market is more important than receiving financial aid. Besides the stimulation of domestic production, the preferential trade will contribute to diversification of exports. This, for example, is a critical issue in case of Moldova, whose exports are oriented mainly towards Russia.

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<sup>115</sup> The MEDA program is the principal financial instrument of the European Union for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The program offers technical and financial support measures to accompany the reform of economic and social structures in the Mediterranean partners, [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/euromed/meda.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/meda.htm) [accessed December 12, 2006].

<sup>116</sup> Launched by the EC in 1991, the Tacis Program provides grant-financed technical assistance to 12 countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan), and mainly aims at enhancing the transition process in these countries (Mongolia was also covered by the Tacis program from 1991 to 2003, but is now covered by the ALA program), [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/ceeca/tacis/](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/tacis/) [accessed December 6, 2006].

<sup>117</sup> "European Neighborhood Policy: Strategy Paper," 26. The Preferential Trade Agreement (PTAs) offers preferential access to the EU Internal Market in return for combinations of reciprocal access, trade liberalization or 'better' social and environmental protections. The EU's PTAs include social, governance and environmental criteria, [http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global/development/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global/development/index_en.htm) [accessed January 10, 2007].

## **B. THE RATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE**

The rationale behind the ENP is to establish an international framework aimed towards the generation of domestic reform. Since it mirrors to some degree the structure of the accession process, it features one of the milestones of the EU enlargement strategy – political and economic conditionality.<sup>118</sup> Political conditionality helps the socializing agent – an IO or other international actor – to “bring about and stabilize political change” in the target state.<sup>119</sup> The EU policy in the neighborhood follows the same strategy as for the enlargement – reinforcement by reward, support and punishment. Partner countries are rewarded depending on the level of compliance with the IO’s norms and rules. The rewards may be social (mainly international recognition) or material (financial assistance, integration with the IO’s structures or military protection). The “Big Bang” enlargement has demonstrated the effectiveness of the EU strategy based on political conditionality. The question then is: Would the same strategy be similarly efficient in the relationship with states that do not have a membership perspective? While the ENP has inherited a lot from enlargement, it differs in some very important features. In general, the effectiveness of conditionality depends on four factors: determinacy of conditions, size and speed of rewards, credibility of rewards and domestic costs.

### **1. Determinacy of Conditions**

Academic literature suggests that in order to ensure compliance of the target government with international norms and organizational rules, the IO must set up its requirements as conditions. Determinacy is important because it clarifies and formalizes the rules. The clearer is a rule, the more ‘legalized’ and compulsory is its status and, as a consequence, the greater is its determinacy. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier point out that determinacy has a significant informational value and makes conditionality more

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<sup>118</sup> “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007,” Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2006)649 final, 8.11.2006), [http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/ia\\_2006/com\\_2006\\_0649\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/ia_2006/com_2006_0649_en.pdf) [accessed December 12, 2006].

<sup>119</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, “European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe,” *East European Politics and Societies* 21, no. 1, 127.

credible. Thus, it informs the target government about the actions that need to be taken in order to get rewards and, at the same time, limits the ability of the socializee “to manipulate the rule” or, in general, to avoid its adoption.<sup>120</sup> If the rules are well determined, they provide a roadmap for reforms.<sup>121</sup> For example, the “Copenhagen Criteria” constitute the guidelines for all reforming candidate countries.<sup>122</sup>

Several analyses indicate the weakness of the ENP rules from the point of view of their legal status and circumstantialities. While the EU relationship with the CEE countries was founded on legal documents – the Europe Agreements – the Action Plans proposed within the ENP are just political documents that have no legal force. Moreover, the ENP framework does not have its own set of defined criteria similar to the *acquis*. Commentators have noticed that although initially the EU has referred to compliance with the *acquis communautaire* as the basis for its relations with the neighbors, this conditionality has been replaced by reference to the vaguer term “European standards.” Such an approach is motivated by the difference in starting points between most of the ENP countries and those of the CEE.<sup>123</sup>

There is also an understanding among the EU policy-makers that, under conditions when the membership perspective is absent, the target governments are tempted to refuse to align with the *acquis* because it will be considered “unreasonably onerous, thus undermining cooperative engagement.”<sup>124</sup> Several scholars noted that in general the determinacy of the ENP Action Plans varies extensively and, as the experience of the CEE countries’ accession demonstrates, the variations in the alignment

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<sup>120</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization*, 12.

<sup>121</sup> Amichai Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Neighborhood Policy Achieve Compliance?” Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law (Stanford), CDDRL Working Papers, 68 (August 2006), 414.

<sup>122</sup> At the June 1993 European Council (Denmark) the EU has established criteria for the membership known as “Copenhagen Criteria”. To become a member of the EU, any aspiring country must meet the following criteria: Political – stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy; the rule of law; human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; Economic – existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; Acceptance of the Community *acquis* – ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

<sup>123</sup> Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement,” 414 – 415.

<sup>124</sup> Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement,” 415.

with the *acquis* have a significant impact on the leverage. Main critics of the Action Plans refer to the low specificity of most priorities and tasks, as well as sometimes unclear specification of the partner countries' commitments. For example, in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan it is not explicitly clear who is to "undertake first assessment of the impact of EU enlargement on trade between the EU and Ukraine during 2005 and regularly thereafter as appropriate."<sup>125</sup> Or, the EU-Moldova Action Plan contains such confusing demands as to "[e]nsure there is a contact point dealing with implementation of the movement of goods, which could also be used to improve information flows between the EU and Moldova and to exchange information with operators."<sup>126</sup>

Another example of the ENP weakness is the EU reaction to the democratic transformation in Ukraine brought by the 2004 "Orange Revolution". Despite the fact that Ukraine has fulfilled the main commitments according to its Action Plan and organized democratic elections, the ENP could not outline any further measures to help in "maintaining [the] democratic transition beyond the first step of free and fair elections."<sup>127</sup> This confirms that the determinacy of the ENP rules is affected by the lack of comprehensive and detailed guidelines for reforms.

## **2. Size and Speed of Rewards**

According to the external incentives model, compliance will vary depending on the 'size' and speed of rewards.<sup>128</sup> Acknowledging that the accession perspective is "the most powerful stimulus for reforms," the EU officials considered that a "less ambitious

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<sup>125</sup>Karen E. Smith, "The Outsiders: the European Neighborhood Policy," *International Affairs* 81, no. 4 (2005), 764.

<sup>126</sup> EU – Moldova Action Plan, [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action\\_plans/moldova\\_enp\\_ap\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf) [accessed December 20, 2006].

<sup>127</sup> Iris Kempe, "Identifying an Agenda for a New Eastern Policy – Connecting the German and Finnish EU Presidencies," Center for Applied Policy Research (C.A.P.), Strategy Paper no. 1 (2007), prepared for the Conference "Looking Towards the East. Connecting the German and Finnish EU Presidencies," Berlin (December 17 – 19, 2006), <http://www.cap-lmu.de/publikationen/2007/cap-aktuell-2007-01.php> [accessed February 20, 2007].

<sup>128</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization*, 13.



goal,” based on the “concept of proximity *would* have a positive effect.”<sup>129</sup> However, the available studies by now indicate that the EU expectations were far too optimistic.

It is necessary to highlight the ambiguity of the EU approach towards the future membership perspectives for the ENP countries. The official ENP documents do not reject categorically the possibility of accession (at least for the European states which would correspond to the EU criteria). Yet, in the ENP framework the prospect of membership is absent for most of the neighbors (especially the Mediterranean states). Moldova and Ukraine are provided with vague and distant accession perspectives, while the future of relations with the South Caucasus countries seems even more ambiguous.<sup>130</sup> At the same time, EU officials clearly stated that the ENP should be regarded as “distinct from enlargement” and should not be perceived as a preparation stage for eventual accession.<sup>131</sup> In addition, it is obvious that the EU is not going to invite new candidates in the near future. Thus, despite the insistent demands from Moldova and Ukraine, the EU did not make the accession perspectives for these countries more credible. Moreover, since the debate over Turkey and the two negative referenda in France and the Netherlands, EU leaders have become more restrictive on EU enlargement, calling for a stricter conditionality towards the new-comers and linking the admission of new members even more closely with the success of the institutional reform agenda within the EU.<sup>132</sup> Therefore, as observed by several analysts, the low probability of any significant future changes in this area will further reduce the socializing capability of the ENP.

Since the membership perspective is *de facto* absent, the EU had to devise alternative incentives within the ENP. From the beginning the EU has emphasized the

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<sup>129</sup> Romano Prodi, “A Wider Europe,” 4. Emphasis added by the author.

<sup>130</sup> Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement,” 412.

<sup>131</sup> Gunter Verheugen, “The European Neighborhood Policy,” address before the Prime Ministerial Conference of the Vilnius and Visegrad Democracies, Bratislava (March 19, 2004), <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/141&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> [accessed December 12, 2006].

<sup>132</sup> “Presidency Conclusions. Brussels European Council, 14-15 December 2006” (16879/1/06, REV1) [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/92202.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/92202.pdf) [accessed December 20, 2006]; “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007,” Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2006)649), Brussels, 08.11.2006 [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2006/nov/com\\_649\\_strategy\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/com_649_strategy_paper_en.pdf) [accessed December 11, 2006].

possibility of establishing close economic and political ties through the development of new structures and “institutions co-owned by the partners.”<sup>133</sup> However, these intentions have not materialized. Several ‘attractive’ incentives which were proposed in the Wider Europe Communication remain predominantly unrealized. Commentators notice that in practice the EU remains reluctant to open those sectors of its Internal Market which are of greatest interest for most of the ENP countries. In particular, this refers to the access for agricultural products and to the free movement of persons.

Scholars point out two additional factors that have compromised the attractiveness of ENP. First, as already mentioned, the ENP framework is based on the previous contractual agreements with the neighboring countries: the PCAs and AAs. Under these legal arrangements, the European neighbors are in a disadvantageous position in comparison to the Mediterranean countries, because even the “most advanced” PCAs with the Ukraine and Moldova “do not establish preferential treatment in trade, lack a timetable for regulatory approximation and ... omit any reference to the prospect of integration into EU structures.”<sup>134</sup> The establishment of a new, more enhanced contractual basis – the “European Neighborhood Agreements” – is reflected in the Constitutional Treaty. However, the French (May 2005) and Dutch (June 2005) referendums blocked this initiative.

The second factor refers to the ENP budget. The EU decided, starting with 2007, to almost double the financial and technical assistance to the ENP countries for the period 2007 – 2013.<sup>135</sup> However, disagreements among the leading Member States upon the EU budget may hamper the availability of additional funds for the ENP.

At the same time, the distribution of the ENP funds reflects a certain prioritization of the Mediterranean region to the disadvantage of the East European neighbors. Thus, the Mediterranean partners will receive approximately 70 percent of the overall ENP budget for 2007 – 2013. As Iris Kempe notes, contrary to the ENP strategic framework,

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<sup>133</sup> Prodi, “A Wider Europe.”

<sup>134</sup> Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement,” 413, footnote 140.

<sup>135</sup> The new ENP Instrument foresees an increase of ENP resources from 8.4 to 14.9 billion Euro.

Russia is also a part of the ENP budget without being a part of the monitoring processes, which evaluates the implementation of the EU demands.<sup>136</sup> This reduces the share for countries like Ukraine or Moldova even further.

Hence, as this subchapter has shown, the quality and quantity of rewards currently offered by the ENP make this program less effective in terms of increasing the target governments' will to comply with the EU rules. The key problem is the vagueness and uncertainty of the incentives. As in the case of the ENP conditionality, even though several attractive incentives were proposed in ENP strategic documents, their potential is not realized in practice. Moreover, the continuation of an ENP budget distribution that is perceived to be 'unfair' from the point of view of the East European neighbors will further diminish the credibility of the EU's policy and thus the impetus for reforms. This is all the more critical since these are exactly those countries which are culturally closest to the EU and have the best perspectives to join the community at some point. For the European neighbor states the practical effectiveness of the new policy instrument is doubtful.

### **3. Credibility of Conditionality**

The effectiveness of the rationalist strategy is highly dependent on the credibility of the conditions set up by the socializing agent. The more credible the promises of the IO are, the more confidence domestic actors will have in their implementation and, respectively, the higher will be their motivation to comply with the IO's rules. The credibility is important both for the rewards granted in case of the adoption of rules and for the sanctions applied towards those states which fail to comply.

The credibility of conditionality may be increased through a greater differentiation in the relationship with targeted countries. Usually, the EU's external relations are based on the regional approach. Nevertheless, the European Commission has approached the pre-accession negotiations with CEE countries on a case-by-case basis. The same technique was transposed to the ENP framework, where the Action Plans are

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<sup>136</sup> Kempe, "Identifying an Agenda".

negotiated individually with each partner. The aim is to create a competitive environment among the ENP countries and exhort those which seek to establish closer ties with the EU.

However, commentators point to several factors that weaken the credibility of ENP conditionality. First, as previously mentioned, many incentives promised in official documents (e.g., “stake in the Internal Market”) have not been specified. Due to the fact that numerous EU demands are barely linked to the rewards, the target governments are uncertain about what incentives will indeed be delivered in practice. Second, the credibility of conditionality is undermined by the mixed signals sent to the ENP countries in the official EU documents and rhetoric.<sup>137</sup> Thus, on the one hand, the Wider Europe Communication stressed that “the benefits from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU” may be offered only “in return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including aligning legislation with the *acquis*.”<sup>138</sup> On the other hand, the Strategy Paper stated that “[t]he EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners” and “[t]here can be no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of priorities.”<sup>139</sup>

In practice, within the ENP strong conditionality competes with the “softer ‘engagement’ strategy” characteristic for previous EU relations with many of its neighbors, especially the Mediterranean countries.<sup>140</sup> If compared to conditionality, a mere engagement strategy appears to be more convenient to the ENP governments

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<sup>137</sup> Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement,” 416.

<sup>138</sup> “Wider Europe – Neighborhood,” 10.

<sup>139</sup> European Neighborhood Policy: Strategy Paper,” 8.

<sup>140</sup> Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement,” 417. ‘Engagement’ is defined as a “foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialize government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways.” This strategy is also known as the strategy of interdependence; see Karen E. Smith, “Engagement and Conditionality: Incompatible or Mutually Reinforcing?” in *New Terms of Engagement*, ed. Richard Youngs (London: The Foreign Policy Center, 2005), 23.

because it fosters long-term democratic processes without challenging a state's sovereignty much.<sup>141</sup>

Because the ENP framework gathers under one 'umbrella' countries with widely diverging interests, the EU can not apply the same conditionality to all of them. Some partners (Moldova, Ukraine) aspire for EU membership and are willing to comply with the entire package of EU rules. Others, for example the Mediterranean countries, are ready for close cooperation with the EU mainly in the security and economical sectors without undertaking significant political transformations. Therefore, the EU risks to dilute its conditionality between "the ENP's competing goals of promoting short-term security and stability – stressing strong policing over fundamental rights and cooperating with existing regimes – while also pursuing democratization and respect for liberal rights, including the Maghreb and Mashreq."<sup>142</sup>

Besides, the ENP credibility is also affected by differences among the EU Member States' approaches towards the ENP. For example, Germany, which is traditionally the driving force of Eastern policy, perceives the ENP through the prism of its objectives in Eastern Europe: good relationship with Russia<sup>143</sup>, advocacy of the CEE countries' interests (especially Poland) and coordination of its initiatives with European and transatlantic partners. The focus of German policy is mainly on Ukraine and Belarus and less on Moldova. Nevertheless, the intention to maintain good relations with these countries and with Russia at the same time has led to a "wait-and-see" policy that lacks "far-reaching visions or solutions regarding the future prospect of EU Eastern

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<sup>141</sup> Smith, "Engagement and Conditionality," 24.

<sup>142</sup> Magen, "The Shadow of Enlargement," 417.

<sup>143</sup> Sometimes it is referred as a "Russia First" policy. Iris Kempe, "From a European Neighborhood."

enlargement, the geographic limits of the EU, or alternative institutional prospects for democratic newcomers such as Ukraine – and potentially Belarus – within the European architecture.”<sup>144</sup>

Germany’s eastern approach contradicts the French insistence to focus more on the Mediterranean. Paris is more interested in developing the Southern Dimension in order to counterbalance the EU’s shift towards the east. Moreover, France is very skeptical about further EU enlargement rounds and regards the ENP as an alternative to full membership. Thus, for example, France has put the issue of absorption capacity at the center of the enlargement debate and has opposed elaborating the “European perspective” for Moldova and Ukraine in the Action Plans.<sup>145</sup> This, for example, was done with the Balkan countries in the Stabilization and Association Process which started in 2000, and proved to be efficient despite the alleged skepticism at the initial stage.<sup>146</sup>

In contrast to both Germany and France, the new EU members (e.g., Poland and the Baltic States) call to direct more support towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus and harshly criticize the ENP for its ineffectiveness.<sup>147</sup> Such differences undermine the official EU rhetoric and decrease the likelihood of compliance with EU norms. At the same time, given the particularities of the EU governance system, the Member States’ attitudes towards the neighbors is crucial.<sup>148</sup> The experience of the last enlargement

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<sup>144</sup> Iris Kempe, “The German Impact on the European Neighborhood Policy,” in “The New Neighborhood Policy of the European Union: Perspectives from the European Commission, France, Germany, Poland, Ukraine and Moldova,” ed. Marco Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnish *Foreign Policy in Dialogue* 6, issue 19 (2006), 33, <http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue19.pdf> [accessed December 14, 2006]. On German eastern policy see also Iris Kempe, “From a European Neighborhood.”

<sup>145</sup> Maxime Lefebvre, “France and the European Neighborhood Policy,” in *The New Neighborhood Policy of the European Union*, ed. Overhaus, Maull and Harnish, 18.

<sup>146</sup> Rafael Biermann, “The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe – Potential, Problems and Perspectives,” Center for European Integration Studies, Discussion Paper C 56 (1999), 20, [http://www.zei.de/zei\\_english/publikation/publ\\_zeic\\_dp.htm](http://www.zei.de/zei_english/publikation/publ_zeic_dp.htm) [accessed December 17, 2007].

<sup>147</sup> More details in Overhaus, Maull and Harnish, eds, “The New Neighborhood Policy of the European Union” and Grzegorz Gromadzki, Raimundas Lopata and Kristi Raik, “Friends or Family?: Finnish, Lithuanian and Polish perspectives on the EU’s policy towards Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova,” FIIA Report, (12/2005), [http://www.upi-fii.fi/doc/FIIA-report\\_12.pdf](http://www.upi-fii.fi/doc/FIIA-report_12.pdf) [accessed December 14, 2006].

<sup>148</sup> The Presidency in the EU Council is taken over for a 6-month period by each Member State on a rotational basis.

round has demonstrated that competition between Member States' interests (geo-strategic, political and economic) has an overall negative impact on the EU conditionality even when strong incentives are offered.<sup>149</sup>

#### **4. Veto Players and Adoption Costs**

The last, but certainly not the least, important factor of the rationalist strategy of socialization refers to the adoption costs and the role of veto players. The use of conditionality itself assumes that when adopting the IO's rules the domestic actors must assume costs, which generally are understood as political or power costs of the target government.<sup>150</sup> Otherwise, if there would be no costs, the conditionality would be superfluous.

Adoption costs depend on the government's preferences and the number of veto players.<sup>151</sup> Veto players are the "actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo."<sup>152</sup> The higher the number of veto players is, the higher the power costs will be for the government. Several studies point out that high domestic costs during the early stages of the enlargement process of the CEE countries undermined the effectiveness of the socialization process until the EU stated clearly the membership perspective.<sup>153</sup> Therefore, the conditionality is effective and the likelihood of rule adoption increases, the more powerful the incentives are, the less the adoption costs and the fewer the veto players.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Magen, "The Shadow of Enlargement," 417.

<sup>150</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, "The International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern Europe: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis," *Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series* 5, no. 28 (August 2005): 6.

<sup>151</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *The Europeanization*, 16.

<sup>152</sup> George Tsebelis, *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 37.

<sup>153</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *The Europeanization*; Schimmelfennig, Egert and Knobel, *International Socialization in Europe*.

<sup>154</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *The Europeanization*, 17.

In their studies on Europeanization scholars often rely on the Freedom Index (FI) data.<sup>155</sup> According to these data, the starting point of the ENP countries is significantly different from that of the CEECs. With the exception of Israel, none of the ENP countries is ranked as ‘free’. Most of the regimes are authoritarian or hybrid. This situation affects the EU conditionality in at least two respects. First, the lack of democracy and liberalization in most of the ENP countries creates a negative cultural mismatch between the EU and the ENP countries. Under such conditions the domestic costs of compliance with the EU rules are high and the adoption of the EU rules in these countries is very demanding. Second, as pointed out by some scholars, most authoritarian regimes perceive the liberal norms as challenging their power base.<sup>156</sup> Thus, the incentives offered by the EU are perceived by the domestic elites as threats to their very existence. Therefore, the EU initiatives and offers are saluted mainly by the more liberal ENP countries (Israel, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine). This argument also stresses the weaknesses of the EU policy towards the neighbors and reveals how much the different interests of the countries put in one ENP ‘basket’ impact upon the success of the conditionality principle.

When referring to domestic costs, the role of third party players in Eastern Europe also needs to be mentioned. The EU agenda in this region is challenged by Russia, a direct EU neighbor and an influential actor in the post-Soviet space. The fact that Moldova and Ukraine are in the Russian “near abroad” makes the case of these countries very specific and substantially increases the adoption costs for both governments. It can be argued that Russia not only exerts an external influence on the EU prospect of both countries, but is able to employ several powerful tools to directly influence the domestic preference building process in both countries, thus increasing the number and relevance of veto players there.

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<sup>155</sup> The FI data are produced by the Freedom House. Applying the categories of “civil rights” and “political rights”, all countries of the world are rated from 1 (best) to 7 (worst). Thus, depending on the combined average of the political rights and civil liberties the countries are categorized as Free, Partly Free, or Not Free, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2006> [accessed December 01, 2006].

<sup>156</sup> Schimmelfennig, “The International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern Europe,” 6.



Compared with the EU, Russia is in an even more ‘advantageous’ position in the struggle for Moldovan and Ukrainian “hearts and minds.” First of all, in maintaining its influence over the former Soviet states, Russia strongly supports those political parties, leaders and non-governmental organizations that are generally oriented towards deeper integration and closer ties with the “big eastern brother.” Second, pertaining to the status of an energetic superpower, Russia is using its economic ‘tools’ in support of the political ones. Although East European countries try to diversify their economic and security relations, their economies are still oriented mainly towards the Russian market and are highly dependent on Russia’s energy supply. Thus, though widely presented as ‘just’ an economic issue, Russia used the price of gas as a powerful political tool in recent winters against Ukraine and Moldova in order to ‘punish’ these countries for their pro-Western orientation. In addition, Russia has used its economic leverage by imposing restrictions on Moldovan agricultural products and wine imports, which to a significant degree finance the Moldovan state budget. Finally, Russia is the major player in the “frozen” conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Though a mediator in the Transnistrian conflict on Moldovan territory, Russia *de facto* provides full support to the separatists and contributes to the strengthening of their statehood, thus making the re-unification of Moldova even more difficult.<sup>157</sup>

All these issues are very sensitive and have a significant impact on the domestic decision-making process in Moldova and Ukraine by raising the power costs for the local governments. The EU is interested in maintaining a balanced and stable long-term relationship with Russia because it is an important energy supplier and trade and investment partner for the Member States. At the same time, the EU must address security issues in its neighborhood. Thus, the EU took concrete measures to strengthen its engagement in the Transnistrian conflict. In 2005 the EU appointed a Special Representative (EUSR) to Moldova, opened an EU Delegation office in Chisinau, and launched the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) at the Moldovan-Ukrainian

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<sup>157</sup> For additional information on Russian policies towards its neighbors see: Dov Lynch, ed., “What Russia sees,” Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper no. 74 (January 2005); Fraser Cameron and Jarek M. Domanski, “Russian Foreign Policy with Special Reference to its Western Neighbours,” European Policy Center, EPC Issue Paper no. 37 (July 13, 2005).

border.<sup>158</sup> Besides that, the EU, along with the US, participates as observers in the ‘5 +2’ negotiations.<sup>159</sup> Nevertheless, the Union’s reluctance to offer to its new eastern neighbors a stake in the Internal Market further keeps these economies dependent on Russia. Therefore, in order to avoid internal crises, the Moldovan and Ukrainian decision makers may be reluctant to undertake risky transformations that would be neither supported by the population nor ‘welcomed’ by Moscow.

## **C. THE CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE**

The last chapter evaluated the ENP effectiveness from a rationalist perspective. Now this thesis will analyze the EU strategy of socialization from the constructivist point of view. In contrast to the rationalist strategy based on material factors, the constructivist approach to socialization emphasizes that compliance of target governments with IO rules is mainly driven by persuasion, engagement and complex learning. According to the social learning model the socialization process is affected by the legitimacy of the IO’s rules, the level of identification of domestic social groups with the IO, as well as by the resonance of the international norms and rules in the domestic arena, which is to a large degree determined by the level of cultural match.<sup>160</sup> This subchapter will evaluate the impact of the ENP on all of these factors.

### **1. Legitimacy**

Any rule adoption process is strongly affected by the legitimacy of the rules. However, legitimacy affects adoption particularly in the international system because of its central tenet of anarchy, i.e., the lack of a supreme legal authority able to enforce rules. As Franck suggests, the domestic laws differ from the international rules and norms in the way they secure compliance. Compliance with domestic laws can be enforced since they are located “within an infrastructure of government, constitution, courts, and

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<sup>158</sup> The EUBAM’s mission consists in providing assistance in fight against arms and drugs trafficking, smuggling, organized crime and corruption.

<sup>159</sup> Since 1997 the negotiations on Transnistria operate in the five-side format proposed by Russia. This includes: Moldova, OSCE, Russia, Ukraine and the Transnistrian region. In October 2005 the EU and the US joined this format as observers.

police.” Instead, in the international system rules “obligate ... primarily because they are like the house rules of a club”<sup>161</sup> – they are mainly politically binding, depending much more on their persuasive power.

Legitimacy reflects “the quality of rules themselves and the process through which they were established and are transferred to the target states.”<sup>162</sup> According to Franck, the determining factors of rules adoption are “the clarity with which the rules communicate, the integrity of the process by which the rules were made and are applied, their venerable pedigree and conceptual coherence. In short, it is the legitimacy of the rules which conduces to their being respected.”<sup>163</sup>

Some commentators point out the weaknesses of the ENP rules’ legitimacy. Some scholars suggest that compliance with the IO’s rules is affected by such factors as the determinacy of the rules and the objectivity and fairness of the rule-adoption process.<sup>164</sup> Thus, the ENP Action Plans have several shortcomings in terms of legitimacy. As previously mentioned, most of the priorities are unspecified; sometimes it is not clear who is responsible for the implementation of particular actions; it is not specified how progress will be judged; and some objectives that are to be met do not have a clearly specified time period.<sup>165</sup> Another striking aspect is that although the Action Plans are ‘jointly’ designed documents, the list of tasks that partners must accomplish is much longer than the list of the EU or ‘joint’ tasks. For example, Moldova is responsible for most of the 294 actions listed in the EU-Moldova Action Plan. Just 14 actions clearly refer to the EU, while the other 40 fall under the ‘joint’ responsibility.<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization*, 18.

<sup>161</sup> Thomas M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 38.

<sup>162</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization*, 18.

<sup>163</sup> Thomas M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*, 38

<sup>164</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization*, 18; Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement,” 422.

<sup>165</sup> Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement,” 421; Karen E. Smith, “The Outsiders,” 764-65.

<sup>166</sup> The EU – Israel Action Plan is an exception. As noted by Smith this may be interpreted as an “indication of the more equal standing of the two sides”, or as a “sign of the EU offering Israel too much of a carrot and not using enough of a stick.” (Karen E. Smith, “The Outsiders,” 766).

As already mentioned, the EU applies to the ENP countries the same conditionality as for the enlargement process. Yet, the lack of a membership perspective undermines the legitimacy of the EU demands. Although partners are required to undertake reforms in the decision-making process and in domestic institutions, the ENP has excluded them from the possible integration into the EU institutions at present, as well as in the foreseeable future. The ENP's formula of "everything but institutions" confirms this approach. Thus, these deficiencies impact on the perception of fairness of the ENP rules, and the question "[w]hether ENP countries will accept as legitimate a system where they have neither present decision-making power, nor the prospect of equal participation in the future" remains open.<sup>167</sup>

## **2. Identity**

The likelihood of compliance with the international norms increases when the elites and society of the target state identify themselves positively with the IO which promotes these rules.<sup>168</sup> The "Complex Socialization" model presumes that the socialization process is more efficient when both social groups (elites/state and population/nation) see the socializing agent as a 'Significant We' (out-group 1).<sup>169</sup> To a certain degree, Moldova and Ukraine (post-"Orange Revolution") would probably qualify for this out-group. However, the ambiguities in Moldovan foreign policy and the parliamentary election in Ukraine in 2006 testified to a different orientation of a considerable part of the elites and societies in both countries. Nevertheless, a formal behavioral and discursive analysis of these countries demonstrates their basically pro-European orientation.

Thus, for example, the Foreign Policy Guidelines of Moldova in 1998 already confirmed the "European choice," stating that EU membership is a key strategic objective. Since then this orientation was restated in several official documents, national

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<sup>167</sup> Magen, "The Shadow of Enlargement," 422.

<sup>168</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization*, 19.

<sup>169</sup> Flockhart, "Complex Socialization," 103.

programs and institutional reforms.<sup>170</sup> Besides the official rhetoric, the European integration strategy is also supported by the Moldovan population. Thus, the opinion poll in March-April 2006 shows that in a referendum 70% of respondents would vote for “integration into the EU.” In December 2005 and November 2004 this figure was 64.3% and 66%, respectively.<sup>171</sup>

After the “Orange Revolution” Ukraine’s pro-European orientation was strengthened. Although EU integration was part of the Ukrainian foreign policy goals already under Kuchma’s presidency, it was not supported by corresponding reforms. The revolutionary events and the signing of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan in February 2005 clearly demonstrated the willingness of the Ukrainian elites “to develop an internal dimension of the country’s European policy.”<sup>172</sup> Despite the defeat of the pro-Western forces in the 2006 parliamentary elections, Ukraine has repeatedly confirmed its strategic orientation towards European integration and its commitment to continue the implementation of political and economic reforms according to the EU-Ukraine Action Plan.<sup>173</sup>

Undoubtedly, the EU played a key role in forging a European identity in both countries and continues to do so through the ENP framework. Persuasion and social learning are the most suitable techniques for this task. Social learning is critical in the process of transforming individual and collective identities. It is facilitated by transactions which occur within organizational settings, involve communication between

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<sup>170</sup> In 2000 the Moldovan Foreign Ministry issued a document, “The Strategy of the Republic of Moldova for Association with the EU”. In 2002 a Presidential decree established a National Commission for European Integration, headed by the Prime Minister. One year later, a new Department for European Integration was created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The same year, the National Commission for European Integration adopted the “Concept of Integration of the Republic of Moldova into the EU”, which was presented to the EU. In 2005, the newly elected Parliament adopted a common declaration on the partnership among the political parties (?) aiming at realization of the European integration objectives.

<sup>171</sup> “Barometer of Public Opinion: March – April 2006,” *Institutul de Politici Publice Press Release*, 20 April 2006; “Barometer of Public Opinion conducted in December 2005,” *Institutul de Politici Publice Press Release*, 23 December 2005; “Barometer of Public Opinion: October-November 2004,” *Institutul de Politici Publice Press Release*, October 10, 2004, [www.ipp.md](http://www.ipp.md) [accessed January 10, 2007].

<sup>172</sup> Iryna Solonenko, “The European Neighborhood Policy – The Perception of Ukraine,” in “The New Neighborhood Policy of the European Union,” ed. Overhaus, Maull and Harnish, 47.

<sup>173</sup> For additional information on EU-Ukraine relations visit [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/ukraine/intro/index.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ukraine/intro/index.htm).

human agents about “self-understanding, perception of reality, and ... normative expectations,” and which promote “shared normative and epistemic understandings.”<sup>174</sup> Since it is an interactive social-cognitive process, social learning occurs through “interaction between domestic and international norm entrepreneurs and transnational frameworks.”<sup>175</sup> How then do the ENP instruments contribute to this?

A general critique addressed to the ENP mentions the heterogeneity of its members.<sup>176</sup> This aspect refers to the cultural match and identity. The ENP countries differ in their goals and interests towards the European Union. Since the EU is applying a common framework for countries with yet distant but still real membership perspective (East European neighbors) and those which would hardly ever become EU members (North Africa, Middle East), even in the potential candidate countries the motivation for compliance with the EU norms and standards seems problematic.

Despite this fact, the EU has a lot of opportunities through which it can contribute to the formation of a European identity. First of all, the ENP framework has intensified the official interaction between the EU and ENP countries. The mechanism of monitoring and action in different committees provides rich opportunities for an enhanced communication. Apart from that, the ENP offers other effective features for the promotion of social learning.

A series of twinning programs are intended to provide the possibility of sharing the professional and technical experience of the member states with those of the ENP. They may also contribute to the development and strengthening of interpersonal links across the EU's and member countries' institutions. As the experience of the CEE and Balkan countries shows, the personal relationship between EU and local experts plays a

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<sup>174</sup> Adler and Barnett, “A Framework,” 44. On the role of learning in foreign policy see Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994).

<sup>175</sup> Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement,” 425.

<sup>176</sup> Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighborhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU's Periphery”, Center for European Integration Studies, Discussion Paper C 158 (2006), 28.

key role in the success of the twinning programs.<sup>177</sup> Although the development of such programs is projected in the ENP framework, there are few examples of their realization.

Social learning may also be facilitated through various societal interactions. Thus, the candidates for accession to the EU benefited from a series of community programs in several areas.<sup>178</sup> These community programs were supplemented by a number of specialized agencies opened by the EU.<sup>179</sup> Despite the participation of some of the ENP countries in community programs, the twinning program and agency components of the ENP are still predominantly in the planning stages.

No less important for social learning are the people-to-people contacts, such as cultural exchanges, informal visits, vacation, etc. The ENP framework foresees facilitation of migration and movement for citizens from neighboring countries. However, until now the EU visa regime is still in force, despite the fact that some of the ENP countries (e.g., Moldova) have already lifted the entry visas for the EU citizens.

### **3. Resonance**

The domestic impact of international norms is more powerful when these norms resonate with existing norms and rules in domestic politics. It was already mentioned that in terms of the cultural match the starting point of the ENP countries was far lower than that of the CEE countries. Under such conditions the EU has a more difficult task to accomplish in transforming the domestic fertility ground for the adoption of its rules. Persuasion is the most effective mechanism for this goal.

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<sup>177</sup> Magen, "The Shadow of Enlargement," 425.

<sup>178</sup> For example, in the fields of research and development, public health, environment, consumer protection, small and medium enterprises, customs, gender equality, media, culture, youth, higher education, information and technology.

<sup>179</sup> The specialized agencies included the European Agency for Reconstruction, European Environmental Agency, European Training Foundation, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, and the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (Magen, "The Shadow of Enlargement," 426, footnote 200).

As a cognitive process and a powerful mechanism of social influence, persuasion “involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt coercion.”<sup>180</sup> Academic literature examines the causal relationship between the design of organizational platforms and the impact of persuasion on domestic actors. Intensified professional contacts within thick institutional environments contributes to the creation of “epistemic communities” which help to promote international communication and socialization processes, as well as strengthen the interpersonal persuasion effects.<sup>181</sup>

Similar to the instruments used by the EU in its negotiations with the CEE countries (the Accession Partnerships and Progress Reports ), the EU’s persuasive power is strengthened through the ENP Action Plans, the Country Reports and the subsequent monitoring process. All these elements “mark a degree of intensification of the process of cognitive engagement, reflection, and argumentation about the content of desired norms and rules.”<sup>182</sup> Using this form of communicative action, the EU sets the agenda for debates, identifies the areas of necessary change, proposes policy solution, praises those who comply and “shames” the non-conformers.

In the same context, the ENP framework contributes to the thickening of the institutional interaction established earlier by the PCAs and AAs. The creation of a network of sub-committees is intended to upgrade the scope and intensity of the dialogue and cooperation at the political and bureaucratic level. However, as noted by many commentators, until now the EU has established only a few sub-committees with Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco predominantly on Human Rights and Justice and Security, and the European Commission is negotiating with Israel the establishment of sub-committees that would address broader economical and political issues.<sup>183</sup> At the same time, there are no sub-committees established between the EU and its Eastern neighbors.

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<sup>180</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Sanctions, Social Learning and Institutions: explaining State Compliance with the Norms of the European Human Rights Regime,” ARENA Working Papers, WP 99/11, 7.

<sup>181</sup> Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 3. According to Haas an “[e]pistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area”.

<sup>182</sup> Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement,” 423.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, 424.



Academic literature summarizes the key factors that may undermine the persuasive impact of the ENP on compliance. The effectiveness of the external persuasion is higher where the “threat from the counterattitudinal group is low, where the persuadee wishes to belong to the group of the persuader, and where the issue is highly technical or of little importance to the actor whose agreement is required.”<sup>184</sup> In both cases – in Moldova and in Ukraine – the role of the counterattitudinal group is the most important one. As already mentioned, the pro-European aspirations in both states are challenged by the supporters of a deeper integration and closer relationship with Russia. Respectively, the task of the ENP is to contribute to the minimization of this group’s impact on domestic resonance.

This chapter has evaluated the effectiveness of the European Neighborhood Policy from a rationalist and a constructivist perspective. The next chapter will focus on NATO and analyze the effectiveness of the Partnership for Peace program as the main socializing mechanism in dealing with NATO’s partners.

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<sup>184</sup> Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement,” 424.

#### **IV. THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM**

The unprecedented political changes that occurred on the European continent in the late 1980s and early 1990s affected all the International Organizations responsible for European security. Among them, NATO was forced to undertake the most cardinal transformation for two main reasons. First of all, the new environment was characterized by the demise of the main enemy – the Socialist bloc. Therefore the first key task of the Alliance was to redefine its *raison d'être* and to adapt its security concept to the new circumstances. The very existence of NATO – which primarily was a collective defense organization – was at stake. Second, NATO was challenged by the CEE countries which regained their independence from the Soviet regime and directed their focus on the EU and NATO as the main guarantors of their national well-being and security and away from the internally unstable and still potentially threatening Russia. Thus, the Alliance had to find a way to deal with the newly emerging democracies without compromising its own capacity to act and without overstretching its security commitments.

NATO found itself in a difficult situation. On the one hand, the Alliance did not have the will and was not ready before 1994 to respond positively to the accession demands of the CEE states. On the other hand, the Member States could not allow a potentially threatening security vacuum on the European continent. After long and fierce debates, NATO finally came out with a new strategic vision that, among others, foresaw the engagement of the Alliance in the democratization process in CEE states which were no longer seen as enemies.

##### **A. THE PFP – ORIGINS, RATIONALE, PRINCIPLES AND INSTRUMENTS**

The Alliance moved in the direction of partnership for the first time at the London summit in 1990, when NATO proposed a new cooperative relationship to all former members of the Warsaw Pact, in effect establishing diplomatic relations with all the former Warsaw Pact countries. Highlighting the achievements of the “most successful defensive alliance in history” in preserving European security, The London Declaration stated that the “Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which

were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them a hand of friendship.”<sup>185</sup> In the meantime, by expressing NATO’s desire to intensify political and military contacts with the CEE countries, the London Declaration prepared the ground for the creation of the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).

NACC was created one year later, at the Rome Summit, and was the Alliance’s first attempt to go beyond “military contacts” and “regular diplomatic liaisons” with the states of the still existing Warsaw Pact and to develop “a more institutionalized relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues.”<sup>186</sup> NACC membership was limited to NATO, former Warsaw Pact states and former Soviet Union republics. Its activities consisted mainly of regular and periodical meetings – workshops, seminars, conferences and colloquiums. NACC’s discussions focused mainly on such areas as peacekeeping, scientific and environmental cooperation, arms control verification, and conversion of defense industries. Nevertheless, partner nations wanted to go further, beyond merely discussing and listening to complaints. Since NACC lacked the necessary instruments, it could not take any action in such matters as, for example, the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from the Baltic States or the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.<sup>187</sup> When referring to the procedures and method of operation, Jonathan Eyal stresses that NACC was similar to the OSCE: “a gigantic talking shop where the formal opening speeches usually filled up most of the time available and the conclusions of the proceedings merely restated the questions originally posed for debate.”<sup>188</sup> Therefore, since NACC failed to respond to partners’ needs and requirements,

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<sup>185</sup> “Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (“The London Declaration”),” (London, 6 July 1990) [www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b900706a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b900706a.htm) [accessed May 05, 2006].

<sup>186</sup> “Declaration on Peace and Cooperation issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (including decisions leading to the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)) (“The Rome Declaration”),” (Rome, 8 November 1991) [www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b911108b.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b911108b.htm) [accessed May 05, 2006].

<sup>187</sup> David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1998), 96

<sup>188</sup> Jonathan Eyal, “NATO’s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs)* 73, no. 4 (October 1997): 701.

it became imperative for NATO as well as for the partners to move the relationship to a higher level of cooperation.

At the Brussels Summit in 1994, within the framework developed by NACC, the Partnership for Peace Program was launched– a new initiative that has become “one of the most remarkable international achievements in the field of security” in the last decade.<sup>189</sup> The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is based on formal agreements. When joining the Program, partner states sign the PfP Framework Document and provide their Presentation Documents in which they state their commitments in terms of contribution to overall security, establish the areas of cooperation with NATO and present the assets that can be offered to the NATO/PfP multinational operations and exercises. The bi-annual Individual Partnership Programs (IPP), signed between the Alliance and the partner nation, provides the foundation for their cooperation. It is the main working document of the PfP and reflects the goals and ambitions set out by partners in their Presentation Documents. Based on their objectives, partners choose individual activities included in the Partnership Working Plan (PWP), which later became the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Working Plan (EAPWP).<sup>190</sup> Instantly, the new cooperative initiative of NATO was embraced by the majority of the CEE and FSU<sup>191</sup> states.<sup>192</sup>

The aim of the PfP was to establish a practical cooperation between NATO and non-members on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Another significant decision of this Summit was the reaffirmation of the NATO “Open door” policy. The PfP Invitation Document states that “the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to the membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic

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<sup>189</sup> “NATO Transformed,” 16, <http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-trans/nato-trans-eng.pdf> [accessed December 10, 2006].

<sup>190</sup> The EAPWP provide the overarching guidance for the cooperation and the list of supporting activities.

<sup>191</sup> FSU – Former Soviet Union.

<sup>192</sup> By the end of 1994, the PfP Framework Document was signed already by 23 countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Finland, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan).

area.”<sup>193</sup> NATO welcomed its enlargement to the East “as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.”<sup>194</sup> Thus, the Allies provided final answers to long debated questions about the necessity of NATO enlargement.

Under the permanent pressure from CEE aspiring countries, NATO initiated in 1995 a special study that provided answers to the questions on ‘how’ and ‘why’ the Alliance should enlarge.<sup>195</sup> The document argued that “enlargement will contribute to enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area by: [e]ncouraging and supporting democratic reforms...; [f]ostering ... the patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus building...; [p]romoting good-neighborly relations...; [e]mphasizing common defense and extending its benefits and increasing transparency in defense planning and military budgets...; [r]einforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe...; [s]trengthening the Alliance’s ability to contribute to European and international security...; [and s]trengthening and broadening the Trans-Atlantic partnership.”<sup>196</sup>

Originally it was debated in the US Administration whether PfP should replace enlargement, effectively limiting NATO’s outreach to the East to a mere partnership with accession perspective. But increasingly, PfP participation started to be seen as a preparatory step for NATO membership. The point is that through PfP, the Alliance sought to familiarize all partners (including possible future members) with the internal workings of NATO. This was supported by the “NATO Study on Enlargement,” which emphasized that the PfP’s task is to promote the knowledge transfer and learning through seminars, workshops and day-to-day interactions.<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> “Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council,” (Brussels, 10 January 1994) [www.nato.int/docu/basic/b940110a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b940110a.htm) [accessed May 05, 2006].

<sup>194</sup> Ibid.

<sup>195</sup> “Study on NATO Enlargement,” (September 1995) [www.nato.int/docu/basic/enl-9501.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/enl-9501.htm) [accessed May 05, 2006].

<sup>196</sup> “Study on NATO Enlargement,” Chapter 1.

<sup>197</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Compliance and Conditionality,” ARENA Working Papers, WP 00/18 (2000), 8.

Although at the beginning many aspirants saw PfP as a “policy of postponement,” the Program “did address some of their security concerns and established the norm that partners should make contributions to common security.”<sup>198</sup> The Program offered to non-NATO states a new level of cooperation with NATO “at a pace and scope” determined by their capacity and desire.<sup>199</sup> The areas covered by PfP included defense reforms, military education and training, and civil emergency planning. Through PfP NATO sought to assist partners by developing joint planning, joint military exercises, and preparing partners’ forces for participation, along with NATO forces, in peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations.<sup>200</sup> In the meantime, within the PfP framework NATO took on itself certain security obligations to “consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.”<sup>201</sup> This fell short of a full-fledged security guarantee, but helped to reassure the partners.

The main critics of the PfP pointed out that this was just a mechanism to postpone the decision on NATO enlargement. In general, having been created as an instrument for avoiding a discussion about NATO’s enlargement, PfP “was suddenly presented as a structure which ‘neither promises NATO membership, nor precludes this membership’ .... Once PfP was in full swing, the same concept was presented as *the* road to NATO membership.”<sup>202</sup>

PfP soon proved its advantages as a flexible initiative, capable to encompass different functions. It offered to partners the choice of ‘self-differentiation’ in their relationship with NATO. Thus, for some countries (i.e., SEE states) it became a starting point for their accession process; for others (i.e., Austria, Finland, Switzerland) it was a possibility to contribute more effectively to international security; and for some countries

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<sup>198</sup> Jeffrey Simon, “Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for a New Era,” *Strategic Forum*, 206 (March 2004), 1.

<sup>199</sup> “Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document.”

<sup>200</sup> Ibid.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid.

<sup>202</sup> Jonathan Eyal, “NATO’s Enlargement,” 702. Emphasis added by the author.

it was an opportunity to learn from NATO allies.<sup>203</sup> In line with the PfP and as recognition of the specific role that Russia and Ukraine play in the European security architecture, NATO established a special relationship with these countries: the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was founded in 1997 and in 2002 became the NATO-Russia Council; the NATO-Ukraine Commission was created likewise in 1997, all of this linked to the first enlargement decision in Madrid in July of that year.<sup>204</sup>

The PfP combined in itself both theoretical (seminars, conferences, workshops) and practical (education and training, exercises) activities which were geared to the promotion of transparency and interoperability, as well as regional military cooperation. Being continuously developed, enhanced and adapted to current challenges, the PfP offers to partners a wide range of instruments and tools for developing their defense and budget planning procedures; improving their national military education and training systems; and, enhancing their military capabilities in order to contribute to NATO-led operations. In contrast to NACC – mainly a political consultation forum – the PfP emphasized ‘operational’ issues. It introduced a structural and procedural depth previously absent in NATO’s cooperation activities.

The PfP framework offered an effective foundation for the partners’ involvement in a NATO’s day-to-day business. Thus, it made possible for partners to open their permanent representation at NATO’s HQ in Brussels. In addition, in 1997 NATO established the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) – a unique PfP structure – designed to facilitate the coordination of joint military activities and military planning within the PfP. Once the PCC consisted of personnel from NATO countries and, since the beginning of 1998, also from partner countries, it offered a great opportunity for intensive interpersonal communication. Due to its location, it also allows the partners to work closer with the Alliance’s Supreme Command (SHAPE). At the same time, the establishment of the PCC significantly contributed to the improvement of the standardization level of the partners’ forces.

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<sup>203</sup> David Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 98.

In 1997, being determined to “raise to a qualitatively new level their political and military cooperation,” NATO and PfP members decided to go further and inaugurated the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). This was a new cooperative mechanism that replaced the NACC and provided a framework for a more expanded political dialog and practical cooperation under PfP.<sup>205</sup>

The flexibility and receptivity of PfP allowed it to be very quickly adapted to NATO’s and partners’ needs as well as to the new security challenges. For example, when the 1999 enlargement round discovered a series of problems and difficulties of new members’ integration into the organization, NATO decided to focus more attention on the preparation of future aspirants. Using available mechanisms and tools within the framework of PfP, NATO developed a set of additional requirements for those partners who aspire to membership, allowing them to gradually enhance their structures and capabilities. As a consequence, those countries that joined NATO in 2004 were much better prepared and could easier integrate into NATO’s structures.

Membership Action Plan (MAP) went further than the “Study on NATO Enlargement” in defining the requirements for the aspirants on their path to membership. To some degree, the invitation to MAP is a strong indication for an aspiring country about its perspective to become a NATO member (though without being automatic).<sup>206</sup>

As NATO continued its enlargement and several partners joined the Alliance, the PfP agenda was re-oriented towards the needs of the remaining partner states. Thus, NATO proposed initiatives such as the Partnership Action Plan on Combating Terrorism (PAP-T) and Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institutions

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<sup>204</sup> For more information on NATO-Russia cooperation see <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html> [accessed January 15, 2007]. For NATO-Ukraine relations see <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/index.html> [accessed January 20, 2007].

<sup>205</sup> “Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council,” (Sintra, Portugal, May 30, 1997) [www.nato.int/docu/basic/b940110a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b940110a.htm) [accessed May 05, 2006].

<sup>206</sup> Jeffrey Simon, “Roadmap to NATO Accession: Preparing for Membership,” INSS Special Report (October, 2001) [http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SR\\_02/SR\\_02.htm](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SR_02/SR_02.htm) [accessed May 05, 2006].



Building (PAP-DIB).<sup>207</sup> These ‘tools’ were specifically designed to enhance cooperation between NATO and the partners in combating global terrorism as well as to assist partner states in their efforts to reform national defense and security sectors.

Accordingly, as a further step in strengthening the Partnership, NATO proposed a more comprehensive and advanced instrument – the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). It comprises all basic PfP initiatives and tools and establishes a bilateral, more individualized and intensified, cooperation between NATO and the partner country, even if that country does not intend to join NATO. The IPAPs cover such objectives as political and security issues; defense, security and military issues; public information; science and environment; civil emergency planning; and administrative, protective security and resource. The Action Plan is open to any partner (apart from those participating in MAP) who is politically willing and practically able to pursue its objectives.<sup>208</sup> Similar to the ENP Action Plans, the IPAPs are ‘jointly’ owned by NATO and the partner states. The partners’ performance is monitored and evaluated each year at the “NATO + Partner” meetings at the level of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The current state of relations between the NATO and PfP countries is presented below in Table 6.

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<sup>207</sup> PAP-T is the “main platform for joint efforts by Allies and Partners in the fight against terrorism. It serves as a useful tool in facilitating NATO’s strategic outreach to Partners, particularly from Central Asia and the Caucasus and, as the first result-oriented action plan, contributes to NATO’s general effort to keep Partnership active and relevant in the present security environment.” Additional information is available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b040623be.htm> [accessed December 27, 2006]. PAP-DIB aims to “reinforce efforts by EAPC Partners to initiate and carry forward reform and restructuring of defense institutions to meet their needs and the commitments undertaken in the context of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document and EAPC Basic Document, as well as the relevant OSCE documents including the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.” Additional information is available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b040607e.htm> [accessed December 15, 2006].

<sup>208</sup> For more information about the IPAP see <http://www.nato.int/issues/ipap/index.html> [accessed January 10, 2007].

Table 6. Current Status of the Partnership for Peace Members (Data retrieved from <http://www.nato.int>)

Country	PfP/EAPC	IPAP	MAP	Intensified dialog	Special relationship
Albania	1994/1997	1999			
Armenia	1994/1997		2005		
Austria	1995/1997				
Azerbaijan	1994/1997		2004		
Belarus	1995/1997				
Bosnia-Herzegovina	2006*				
Croatia	2000	2002			
Finland	1994/1997				
Georgia	1994/1997		2004	2006	
Ireland	1999				
Kazakhstan	1994/1997				
Kyrgyzstan	1994/1997				
Moldova	1994/1997		2006		
Montenegro	2006*				
Russia	1994/1997				NATO-Russia Council (2002)
Serbia	2006*				
Sweden	1994/1997				
Switzerland	1996/1997				
Tajikistan	2002				
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) <sup>1</sup>	1995/1997	1999			
Turkmenistan	1994/1997				
Ukraine	1994/1997			2005	NATO-Ukraine Commission (1997)
Uzbekistan	1994/1997		2004		

Note: \* - Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia joined the PfP on December 14, 2006.

<sup>1</sup> Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

In conclusion, it should be mentioned that in parallel with PfP (whose focus was mainly on the CEE and FSU states), NATO has approached the problems of security and stability in other regions. Thus, in 1994 the Alliance launched the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and in 2004 the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).<sup>209</sup> Despite the fact that the instability in these regions had direct impact on European security and on NATO, the Alliance decided to establish the cooperation with them outside the PfP framework, allowing only limited involvement in the Partnership.<sup>210</sup>

## **B. RATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE**

Academic literature suggests that NATO's socialization strategy may be situated somewhere between the 'hard' and 'soft' conditionality.<sup>211</sup> On the one hand, NATO follows the strategy based on material incentives and links the benefits of future membership to compliance with its demands, altering in this way the preferences of target states. On the other hand, especially in relations with those countries that seek closer cooperation with the Alliance but do not intend to join it, NATO explicitly relies on dialogue and consultations in building a domestic political consensus that would foster transformation and change. Rather than directly affecting the domestic actors' preferences, this strategy aims at changing their "way of thinking."<sup>212</sup>

The character of NATO's policy on PfP and the variety of available instruments make possible the use of a flexible socialization strategy. It may be argued that the level of conditionality applied to a partner country depends on the ambitions of that particular country. The Alliance's demands become stronger and more determined as the level of

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<sup>209</sup> The Mediterranean Dialog (MD) comprises seven countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. For more information about MD see <http://www.nato.int/med-dial/home.htm> [accessed January 15, 2007]. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative comprises: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia was invited by NATO but did not respond to invitation yet. Additional information is available at <http://www.nato.int/ici/home.htm> [accessed January 15, 2007].

<sup>210</sup> The countries of the Mediterranean Dialog are invited to participate in certain PfP training activities (workshops, seminars, courses) and as observers at NATO/PfP exercises.

<sup>211</sup> Checkel, "Compliance and Conditionality," 8. Checkel argues that 'hard' conditionality is characteristic for the EU, while 'soft' conditionality – for the Council of Europe.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid.

cooperation with the partner country moves from a merely general relationship (i.e., within NACC) to deeper cooperation within the PfP and (in particular, with partners who participate in PARP) to a more intensified and individualized partnership within IPAP up to the highest level of conditionality within the Intensified Dialog and MAP. The latter implies a “more cohesive and result-oriented partnership.”<sup>213</sup> In the meantime, increasing the demands at each stage, NATO offers various tools that help partners bring their standards in line with those of the Alliance. By using the full range of opportunities of the PfP, partner countries achieve a level of transparency, knowledge and cooperation which is very close to that of NATO members.<sup>214</sup> Thus, this thesis suggests that within PfP, NATO applies a kind of individualized, tailor-made conditionality.

### **1. Determinacy of Conditions**

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that the Alliance has no “fixed or rigid list of criteria” for accession.<sup>215</sup> The aspiring countries are not required to be fully interoperable with NATO before joining the Alliance, but need to meet “certain minimum standards essential to a functioning and credible Alliance.”<sup>216</sup> Insofar as NATO deliberately did not follow the EU’s approach based on the Copenhagen Criteria of June 1993, according to which the subsequent accession process of each candidate is based on a chapter-by-chapter adoption of the *acquis communautaire*.

Surely, the adherence to democratic norms is a necessary condition of NATO membership, but it is not sufficient. Since it is a security alliance, NATO puts specific emphasis on the development of adequate military capabilities and on the reform of the defense and security sector of the candidate country. To be considered eligible for NATO membership, the aspiring countries must be able to contribute to collective defense and to the Alliance's new missions, as well as to demonstrate the willingness to gradually

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<sup>213</sup> “Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace,” (adopted at Prague Summit, November 21, 2007) <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b021121a.htm> [accessed January 27, 2007].

<sup>214</sup> Checkel, “Compliance and Conditionality,” 8.

<sup>215</sup> “Study on NATO Enlargement,” Chapter 5, paragraph 70.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid., Chapter 3, paragraph 40.

improve their military capabilities.<sup>217</sup> According to NATO's political demands, the new members have to establish, among other things, "appropriate democratic and civilian control of their armed forces."<sup>218</sup>

The determinacy of NATO conditions towards the partners increases as the country moves 'closer' to the Alliance. NATO's demands for joining the NACC were vague. The former 'enemies' were "generically requested to reject an anti-Western identity."<sup>219</sup> When partners were invited to join PfP, NATO's conditions became more determined. Already at this stage, partner countries are specifically asked to increase the "transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes, ensure democratic control of the armed forces," as well as to develop and maintain "capability and readiness" in order to contribute to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations under the UN and/or CSCE/OSCE mandate.<sup>220</sup>

Nevertheless, within PfP, NATO does not ask partners for broader democratic transformation beyond the defense and security sector. Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel argue that in its relations with partners, the Alliance did not set up any specific 'democracy programmes.'<sup>221</sup> Moreover, NATO has used the "reference to democracy more as a 'rhetorical' tool than an actual 'condition' for military cooperation."<sup>222</sup> In this respect, NATO's Partnership policy is often criticized for its high 'inclusiveness'.<sup>223</sup> It is true to some degree that the lack of strong conditionality weakens the socialization effect

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<sup>217</sup> "Study on NATO Enlargement," Chapter 5, paragraph 75.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid., Chapter 5, paragraph 72.

<sup>219</sup> Sonia Lucarelli, "NATO and the European System of Liberal-Democratic Security Communities," in *Socializing Democratic Norms: The Role of International Organizations for the Construction of Europe*, ed. Trine Flockhart (New York: Plagrave Macmillan, 2005), 92.

<sup>220</sup> "Partnership for Peace: Framework Document issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," (Brussels, 10 January 1994) <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b940110b.htm> [accessed May 26, 2006].

<sup>221</sup> Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, "International Socialization in Europe," 39.

<sup>222</sup> Lucarelli, "NATO and the European System," 96.

<sup>223</sup> Along with 'mature' democracies (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland) and emergent democracies (e.g., Moldova, Ukraine, the Balkan and South Caucasus countries), the PfP includes 'mixed' or pure authoritarian regimes (e.g., Central Asian countries or Belarus).

of the PfP. However, NATO has demonstrated a firm exclusiveness when it has refused for a long time to accept Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro into the PfP.<sup>224</sup>

The key feature that determines NATO's conditionality within PfP is the principle of self-differentiation. Whatever the partner's choice and whatever its performance is, NATO is ready to offer a respective set of initiatives that imply various conditions and benefits. For example, once Ukraine and Georgia expressed their intention to join NATO, the Alliance came up with a new proposal to launch an Intensified Dialogue (ID) with these countries.<sup>225</sup> Under this initiative, NATO and the partners agreed upon a set of more concrete actions geared towards further preparation of Ukraine and Georgia for accession.

Accordingly, NATO's flexible approach allows her to offer a different level of intensified cooperation and, respectively, to apply a stronger level of conditionality to countries which do not seek membership. The IPAPs signed between NATO and Moldova, Kazakhstan and Armenia demonstrate that. Under these tools, the partner countries agreed on new terms and conditions to foster the domestic reforms in the defense and security sector and to modernize their armed forces.<sup>226</sup>

Another aspect of NATO's conditionality is that PfP's instruments provide partners with thorough guidelines for the modernization of their armed forces and the reform of their defense and security sectors. This is due to two factors. First, one of NATO's demands towards partners is the contribution to NATO-led operations. Thus, the partners' forces must be interoperable with those of the Alliance. NATO's interoperability requirements are clearly specified in formal documents. To support

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<sup>224</sup> In 2006 after the referendum Montenegro gained independence Serbia. At the Riga Summit, recognizing the positive developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, the Alliance has invited them to join the PfP 'family'. On December 14, 2006 all three countries has signed the PfP Framework Document.

<sup>225</sup> "Statement at the Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Defence Ministers Session," (June 9, 2005) <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-077e.htm> [accessed January 12, 2007]. At the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in New York (September 21, 2006) the NATO Secretary General announced the decision to offer Intensified Dialogue to Georgia. Additional information is available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/09-september/e0921c.htm> [accessed January 12, 2007].

<sup>226</sup> Additional information on IPAPs is available at <http://www.nato.int/issues/ipap/index.html> [accessed January 15, 2007].

partners in attaining these standards, in December 1994 NATO launched the Planning and Review Process (PARP).<sup>227</sup> PARP's resemblance to NATO's defense planning process allows the partners (including those who wish to join NATO) to move closer to the Alliance's standards.<sup>228</sup>

Second, the PAP-DIB provides a guideline for the development of democratically controlled armed forces. The important feature of this initiative is that it refers not only to military institutions but also includes the entire defense and security sector (i.e., government, parliament, etc.) as well as NGOs. Partner's objectives in line with both instruments (PARP and PAP-DIB) are explicitly reflected in the IPAPs, thus making these Action Plans more specified and workable. In addition, the monitoring and evaluation procedures allow NATO to keep track of the partner's performance and provide the necessary advice and support in order to facilitate the accomplishment of the tasks.

In sum, as this subchapter revealed, despite the lack of formalized criteria for accession, NATO sets up within the PfP certain conditions which become more strong and determined as the partner country moves 'closer' to the Alliance. In the meantime, the determinacy of NATO conditionality is supported by the PfP instruments and tools, which offer clear guidelines for partners regarding what standards to achieve and what actions to undertake.

## **2. Size and Speed of Rewards**

As in the case of the EU, NATO's main reward is the membership perspective and, similarly to the ENP, the PfP does not offer such an incentive. Nevertheless, as was already mentioned, NATO is continuously confirming the openness of its 'doors' to any

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<sup>227</sup> Additional information on PARP is available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030208.htm> [accessed January 15, 2007].

<sup>228</sup> NATO has elaborated certain common requirements for the Member States forces which are formalized in the Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) or Allied Publications (APs). Within PARP each partner select a set of Partnership Goals which provide guidelines on how to prepare its military assets designated for the participation in multinational operations. Info about NATO's standardization documents is available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/standard.htm> [accessed February 2, 2007].

partner that is willing and capable to meet NATO's requirements. In this sense, PfP was always regarded by NATO as well as by the partners as a preparatory step for accession.

NATO does not have such a broad range of incentives as the EU to offer to partners below the membership perspective. Its 'carrots' are limited. The main incentives that NATO offers to partners are the possibility to participate in the process of PfP planning and decision-making and partners' gradual integration into the day-to-day Partnership business, including the peace support operations.<sup>229</sup> Along with the PCC and National Representations at NATO HQ, the Alliance developed the concept of "PfP Staff Elements" (PSE), which are engaged in the development of different PfP initiatives, planning and execution of PfP activities. These structures are staffed with the military personnel from partner countries. The direct involvement of partners in the PfP planning and execution process makes the Program more adaptable and reactive to partners' needs and, respectively, helps to shape the PfP activities in such a way as to ensure a maximum of effectiveness.

The most 'active' partners benefit from another attractive incentive – enhanced political and military dialogue and consultation in formal and informal formats at various levels. These activities bring to the agenda the topics which are of NATO and partners' concerns. Such an intensified cooperation gives NATO the opportunity to react swiftly to partner's performances. For example, in contrast to the EU, NATO has been more sensible to the transformations brought in by the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine.<sup>230</sup> Thus, at the NATO-Ukraine summit in February 2005, the Alliance expressed its support for the ambitious reform plans of newly-elected President Victor Yushchenko. It also agreed to "sharpen and refocus" the NATO-Ukraine cooperation in accordance with the new government's priorities. Although the Intensified Dialog does not guarantee the Ukraine's membership in the Alliance, it is a very distinctive and attractive incentive.

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<sup>229</sup> The integration of partners' military in the NATO structures is provided under the concept of "Enhanced and More Operational Partnership" (EMOP) launched at the Washington Summit (April 23-25, 1999) <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9904-wsh/9904-wsh.htm> [accessed January 20, 2007].

<sup>230</sup> As already mentioned in this paper, in 2005 in response to Ukraine's aspirations to join the Alliance and in recognition of democratic transformation that took place in the country, NATO initiated the Intensified Dialog with Ukraine.



It should be mentioned that the implementation of NATO's demands requires substantial resources and, sometimes, the difficult economic situation affects the partners' capacity to cooperate within PfP. Although in contrast to the EU the Alliance's capability to offer financial support is limited, NATO has elaborated the PfP Funding Policy. These resources are not distributed to a particular country but are used to cover the expenses for partners' participation in specific activities (i.e., workshops, seminars, training courses, exercises) according to the partners' IPPs. This instrument contributes to diminishing the negative impact of scarce resources in partner countries.

### **3. Credibility of Conditions**

The PfP's principle of self-differentiation and the Alliance's promptness in offering the promised rewards increase partner's motivation to comply with NATO's demands. In addition, besides merely setting the requirements, the Alliance also actively assists partners in fulfilling them. As mentioned by Lucarelli, the Alliance first defines the boundaries within which partners should act; then it sets the objectives to be achieved (offering the partners the freedom of choice of action); and finally, it establishes the procedures of implementation of a particular objective. These procedures include frequent interaction between NATO and a partner, the exchange of opinion and NATO advice, as well as the process of evaluation and control. Therefore, along with the conditionality and the evaluation of partner's compliance with the Alliance's demands, NATO influences the country's transition "by intervening with softer communicative instruments that include arguing and persuading rather than dictating."<sup>231</sup>

As was argued, the PfP framework provides workable and efficient documents (i.e., IPAPs or Target Action Plan). For example, the key feature of the IPAPs is that the partners present measurable objectives in their foreign, defense and security policies, as well as set up realistic targets for political and defense reforms. The documents also reflect the steps that need to be taken by partners in support of these reforms and provide a timeframe for the implementation of each action. In the IPAPs, partners also indicate which actions may need NATO's assistance. Accordingly, the documents formally

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<sup>231</sup> Lucarelli, "NATO and the European System," 98.

identify those NATO agencies and/or individual Member and partner states that are committed to provide such support.

An important factor that positively impacts the credibility of NATO's conditionality is the leading role of the United States in the Alliance. First of all, since the initiation of discussions about NATO enlargement, the US was the main "driving force" of this process and continues to be so at present. At different stages the American positions were either supported or opposed by the European Member States.<sup>232</sup> The SEE countries that joined NATO in 1999 and 2004 saw the US as the main advocate of their interests and the guarantor of their security from a possible Russian threat. Presently, despite the fierce opposition of most of the "old" European Member States, the United States continues to support further enlargement of the Alliance and encourage those PfP countries that expressed their intentions to join NATO.<sup>233</sup> Finally, besides political support, the US contributes to the partners' performance financially. Thus, in July 1994 President Bill Clinton launched the Warsaw Initiative (WI) aimed at helping "America's new democratic partners ... to advance the Partnership for Peace's goals."<sup>234</sup>

The credibility of NATO demands is also supported by another NATO initiative – the PfP Trust Fund – which has already demonstrated its viability and effectiveness. The

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<sup>232</sup> During the first round of post-Cold War enlargement the US was strongly supported by Germany in accepting Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic in NATO. France, in general, was opposing the enlargement. However, it supported the accession of Romania to NATO. For a more thorough information on the debates among NATO Members over the issue of enlargement see Ronald Asmus, *Opening the NATO Door* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002) and David Yost, *NATO Transformed*.

<sup>233</sup> On March 7, 2007 the US Congress expressed its support for the Ukrainian membership in NATO by approving the Bill "NATO Freedom Consolidation Act 2007," (S 494). The document designates Ukraine (along with Albania, Croatia, Georgia and Macedonia) as eligible to receive assistance under the NATO participation Act of 1994. More information is available at <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s110-494> [accessed March 12, 2007].

<sup>234</sup> "President Remarks to the Polish Sejm" (Warsaw, Poland, July 7, 1994) <http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/political-science/whitehouse-papers/1994/Jul/1994-07-07-President-Remarks-to-the-Polish-Sejm-Warsaw> [accessed January 27, 2007]. The US President's speech in Polish Parliament led to development of the Warsaw Initiative program. The Departments of State and Defense manage the Warsaw Initiative (WI) program to advance the promotion of interoperability with NATO; increase the level of participation in PfP exercises; and support efforts to deepen defense and military cooperation between the United States, NATO, and their PfP partners. President Clinton requested that Congress commit \$100 million in FY 1996 to the program. Congress has funded the Warsaw Initiative program each year since FY 1996 ("Joint Warfighting and Readiness: DoD Execution of the Warsaw Initiative Program," <http://www.stormingmedia.us/43/4335/A433534.html> [accessed January 27, 2007].

aim of the Trust Fund is twofold: it offers assistance to partners in destroying their anti-personnel land mine stockpiles and surpluses of munitions, unexploded ordnance, small arms and light weapons, as well as support partner nations in managing the consequences of defense reforms.<sup>235</sup> In sum, all factors presented above increase the credibility of NATO's demands. In the meantime, when partners start the painful and complicated transformation process they can be pretty confident in NATO's assistance.

#### **4. Veto Players and Adoption Costs**

NATO's tailor-made conditionality allows partner governments to adapt their country's relationship with the Alliance to the adoption of power costs. For example, the same PfP opportunities are available for Sweden and Austria as for Moldova and Ukraine and, finally, for Belarus, Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. However, the relationship between these countries and NATO is different. If cooperation with NATO does not correspond to the perceived national interests or is rejected by the majority of a population, the domestic decision makers may choose a relatively 'passive' partnership, limiting it to occasional formal high-level contacts and few training activities, without undertaking any far-reaching transformation in the defense and security institutions. Even if the PfP country is a non-liberal regime, it still has the possibility to choose a particular level of cooperation with NATO. As long as the partner is not excluded from PfP, the internalization of norms continues (even if very slow) and, consequently, diminishes the number of veto players.

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<sup>235</sup> "NATO/PfP Trust Fund Policy," <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b040906e.htm> [accessed January 27, 2007]. The NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund Policy was established in September 2000 as a mechanism to assist NATO Partner Nations in the safe destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines under the Ottawa Convention. To date, more than 2 million landmines have been successfully destroyed within the framework. The first Trust Fund project was launched in January 2001 for the destruction of Albania's landmine stockpile. Under the expanded policy, the Trust Fund has undertaken projects for the destruction of small arms and light weapons, conventional munitions and rocket fuel oxidizer. Two Trust Fund Projects (destruction of landmines and rocket fuel oxidizer) have been already accomplished in Moldova. In May 2006, NATO in association with the OSCE launched a new project for the destruction of dangerous pesticides. Ukraine has also benefited from NATO support in destroying the landmines stockpiles. In June 2006, NATO and Ukraine launched a new project for the destruction of 1000 Man-portable Air Defense Missiles (MANPADS). This is the largest ever demilitarization project launch in Ukraine. Additional information about the NATO/PfP Trust Fund is available at <http://www.nato.int/pfp/trust-fund.htm>.

It may be argued that in building the relationship with NATO, the governments of the FSU states face a common challenge: a strong external veto player – Russia. In general, Russia was always fiercely opposing NATO enlargement, especially when it comes to the question of the former Soviet Union republics’ membership.<sup>236</sup> As a consequence, the “Russian factor” had a great impact on NATO’s decisions regarding the timing and composition of both enlargement rounds.<sup>237</sup> In fact, as Fierke and Wiener argue, NATO created the PfP in order to avoid possible mobilization of nationalistic forces in Russia in case of an eventual decision to enlarge the Alliance.<sup>238</sup>

For example, Russia is very suspicious about the pro-NATO orientation of Ukraine as well as the Moldovan desire for closer cooperation with NATO. Different Russian political factions support anti-NATO sentiments in Ukraine, thus undermining the credibility of the country’s aspirations to join the Alliance.<sup>239</sup> At the same time, Russia strongly insists on Moldova’s confirmation of its neutrality and non-alignment with NATO as a pre-condition of the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.<sup>240</sup> In both cases, Russian actions raise the adoption costs for Moldovan and Ukrainian elites by ‘feeding’ and increasing the number of domestic veto players.

### C. CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE

Whereas rationalists regard PfP as the “equilibrium solution to the asymmetrical interests of NATO members and CEE countries,” for constructivists it is “an intermediary

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<sup>236</sup> On Russian position towards the NATO enlargement see Vladimir Baranovsky, “Russian Views on NATO and EU,” in *Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and the Price of Membership*, ed. Lieven and Trenin (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003); Denis Alexeev, “NATO Enlargement: A Russian Outlook,” Conflict Studies Research Center, Russian Series 04/33 (November 2004) <http://www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrfc/document-listings/russian/> [accessed January 10, 2007]; Dmitry Danilov, “Russia and European Security,” in “What Russia Sees,” ed. Lynch.

<sup>237</sup> Asmus, *Opening the NATO Door*.

<sup>238</sup> Fierke and Wiener, “Constructing Institutional Interests,” 735.

<sup>239</sup> Vladimir Socor, “Protests in Crimea, Incitement from Moscow, Paralysis in Kyiv Thwart Military Exercises,” (June 14, 2006) [http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume\\_id=414&issue\\_id=3763&article\\_id=2371180](http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=414&issue_id=3763&article_id=2371180) [accessed December 15, 2006].

<sup>240</sup> Vladimir Socor, “Confidential Russia-Moldova Bilateral Negotiations Fail,” (February 1, 2007) [http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume\\_id=420&issue\\_id=3990&article\\_id=2371859](http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=420&issue_id=3990&article_id=2371859) [accessed February 20, 2007].

and probationary stage in the socialization of potential new members.”<sup>241</sup> Through the PfP, the Alliance not only “teaches values, norms, and practices of the Western international community,” but also monitors whether the aspiring countries meet the objectives.<sup>242</sup> Several studies on socialization emphasize the effectiveness of NATO’s policies due to the primordial application of the logic of appropriateness. The following subchapters will focus on the impact of social factors on the effectiveness of the norm diffusion capability of PfP.

### **1. Legitimacy**

Similar to the case of veto players and adoption costs, the principle of self-determination within the PfP increases the legitimacy of NATO’s demands. It is the partner’s decision to choose to what extent he is ready and willing to comply with NATO’s demands. In this respect, two strong points of the PfP should be mentioned. NATO’s key conditions towards the partners refer to the reform of the defense and security sector as well as to the level of interoperability of the armed forces, or at least of those assets that are committed by partners to participate in NATO-led operations. The legitimacy of both demands is undisputable. The issue of national security is always on the list of priorities on government agendas and the transformation of the defense and security sector is an inseparable part of the entire process of democratization (in which most of the partners are involved), while the conformance with the standards of NATO forces is a vital precondition for successful participation in international operations.

The legitimacy of NATO’s conditions is supported also by the adaptability of the PfP. During its entire period, the Partnership was developed and complemented with new initiatives, programs and tools that were necessary to increase the relationship and interaction with partners. Thus, after the accession of seven new members in 2004 was decided, NATO directed the Partnership toward the necessities of the remaining partners. The Alliance reviewed the objectives and priorities of the PfP by shifting its focus

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<sup>241</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation,” *Security Studies* 8, no. 2/3 (Winter 1998/99 – Spring 1999), Special Issue “The Origins of National Interests,” 226.

<sup>242</sup> Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and Integration of Europe*, 93.

geographically to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and conceptually to the defense and security sector reform.<sup>243</sup> In support of partners' efforts, NATO came up with the PAP-DIB – a valuable tool which “provides a common political and conceptual platform for bilateral and multilateral co-operation in developing and sustaining efficient and democratically responsible defence institutions including the armed forces under democratic and civilian control.”<sup>244</sup> Finally, as previously stated, the PAP-DIB is a component part of the IPAP which, in turn, primarily reflects partners' interests in line with NATO's requirements. From this perspective, NATO's conditionality appears to be highly legitimate.

## **2. Identity**

A key factor that facilitated the compliance of the ‘young’ CEE democracies with NATO's demands is the positive identification of their elites with the Alliance, perceived as a wide Euro-Atlantic “democratic security community” rather than a merely a “collective defense club.”<sup>245</sup> The post-Cold War NATO became a very ‘attractive’ International Organization for many in CEE. As Lucarelli argues, the effectiveness of NATO's “power of attraction” is due to the fact that “the boundaries of attractiveness were set implicitly by providing a tangible example of an international identity built within such boundaries and according to clearly defined norms and rules that provided shared meanings and understandings.”<sup>246</sup> The arenas of persuasion set out by NATO contributed to convincing the partners that the proposed rules are valid. The Alliance was seen as a unique International Organization that may guarantee and provide protection and security not only to its members but also to its partners.

Besides, NATO has significantly contributed to the formation of a Western identity not only in the acceding countries but also in partner states. Education is the main

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<sup>243</sup> “The Euro-Atlantic Partnership – Refocusing and Renewal,” <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b040623e.htm> [accessed January 12, 2007].

<sup>244</sup> “Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building,” <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b040607e.htm> [accessed January 14, 2007].

<sup>245</sup> Lucarelli, “NATO and the European System,” 91.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid., 92.

process through which new identities are formed. In its essence, successful transfer of norms was possible due to the mutual recognition by both sides of their particular roles in the educational process: NATO in the role of ‘teacher’, and the partner states in the role of ‘students’.<sup>247</sup> As a professional and competent teacher, NATO transfers its experience by organizing various educational activities.

Through intensive transactions – “bounded communication”<sup>248</sup> – and social learning within the PfP, NATO’s specific policies have contributed to the development of trustful relations and a collective identity. On the one side, the PfP framework has created various channels of communication through which domestic institutions and societies of the target states are socialized. In particular, the socializing effect of NATO policies occurs through different forums for discussion, formal and informal high-level meetings, multiple workshops, seminars, conferences, courses and exercises, as well as bilateral activities between NATO and partners.<sup>249</sup>

On the other side, NATO created conditions for “deep social learning” of the elites and/or population that “has sometimes led to an actual reinterpretation of national beliefs and identity.”<sup>250</sup> The communication between NATO and PfP elites and societies resulted in the formation of internal and external “epistemic communities.” The range of actors implicated in these communities includes politicians, military leaders, parliamentarians and civil society. The promotion of democratic institutional structures takes place through ‘strong’ and ‘soft’ conditionality, technical advice and actual teaching, as well as through providing models to emulate.<sup>251</sup> In addition, the intense communicative frameworks help to develop a shared understanding of the liberal-democratic form of the defense and security sector, as well as a strong institutional relationship between civilians and military.

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<sup>247</sup> Alexandra Gheciu, “NATO and Post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe,” *International Organization* 59, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 982.

<sup>248</sup> Adler and Barnett, “A Framework,” 41.

<sup>249</sup> Lucarelli, “NATO and the European System,” 93.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid.

<sup>251</sup> Ibid., 94.

The socializing role of communication and social learning is particularly important for developing a Euro-Atlantic identity in the former Soviet republics, where a strong 'enemy' image of NATO was portrayed over many decades. Even now, the Alliance is viewed by different social groups (in some cases by the entire societies) as an unfriendly military organization. Therefore, within the context of the internalization of the Western identity in the FSU countries, NATO is focusing its attention specifically on presenting itself as not only military, but also as an important political organization. Image-change is at the heart of these efforts. It is also important to notice that the spectrum of NATO's educational activities targets various social groups rather than being focused only on elites.

The identity factor in Moldova and Ukraine displays different features. It has to be stated from the outset, that in none of the countries the issue of integration in NATO is popular. According to opinion polls (March-April 2006), 34% of the Moldovan population would vote for the country's membership in NATO, while 23.1% would be against. In the meantime, 22.9% of the respondents consider that joining NATO is the best solution to ensure Moldova's security, 35.1% support neutrality and 14.6% support the adherence to the Joint Security Treaty of the CIS. Finally, the polls show that the majority of the Moldovan population has a positive attitude towards NATO. Thus, 29.6% perceive NATO as a "pan-European and transatlantic military-political alliance," while 22.3% of respondents view the Alliance as a "security 'umbrella' for countries of Western, Eastern and Central Europe." The negative attitude towards NATO is characteristic for 7.5% who consider it as "an aggressive organization, a hotbed of instability" for Moldova.<sup>252</sup>

In Ukraine the perspective of joining the Alliance is even less popular. According to opinion polls, almost two-thirds of the population oppose a membership in NATO, while only about 20% would say 'yes' to Ukrainian accession in a referendum.<sup>253</sup> The

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<sup>252</sup> "Barometer of Public Opinion – March-April 2006," *Institutul de Politici Publice Press Release*, April 20, 2006 [www.ipp.md](http://www.ipp.md) [accessed January 10, 2007].

<sup>253</sup> Pavel Korduban, "Yushchenko Faces NATO Referendum Problem," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4, no. 7 (January 10, 2007) [http://www.jamestown.org/publications\\_details.php?volume\\_id=420&issue\\_id=3968&article\\_id=2371784](http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=420&issue_id=3968&article_id=2371784)



integration into the Alliance is mainly supported in the West of Ukraine (41%), while in other regions the majority of the population is against the membership perspective (Centre of Ukraine – 53%, South – 57.3%, and East – 70.7%).<sup>254</sup>

Whereas in the Moldovan case the figures may be explained by the neutrality stipulated in the constitution of the country, which also corresponds to the government's position, in Ukraine the polls show a serious split in the society in the attitudes towards NATO. In addition, after the 2006 Parliamentary elections, ambiguity towards NATO is the characteristic feature for the Ukrainian elites, including serious differences between the President on the one hand, and the Government and the Parliament on the other hand. Under such conditions, pressing for a referendum on accession to NATO would seriously undermine the Ukrainian Euro-Atlantic perspective.

### **3. Resonance**

It is difficult to draw a dividing line between identity and resonance. Both factors are interrelated and equally affect the entire socialization process. Similar to the ENP, the PfP includes countries with different cultural match. As was already pointed out, NATO did not advance very tough conditions to states who wanted to join the PfP. As several scholars notice, the Partnership for Peace includes predominantly developed (Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria) and emerging democracies (Ukraine, Moldova, the Balkans and South Caucasus countries). At the same time, NATO offers the same framework to semi-authoritarian or purely authoritarian regimes (such as in Central Asia or Belarus). Thus, it can be argued that in general the level of cultural match among the PfP members varies greatly.

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[accessed March 13, 2007]; Darion Thuburn, "Troubled Ukraine Eyes NATO Entry In 2008," *Defense News* (April 28, 2006) <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1738633&C=europe> [accessed March 3, 2007]. The original data about the opinion polls were not available.

<sup>254</sup> The data are provided by the Ukrainian Center for Economic & Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov and published in *National Security & Defence* no. 7 (79), (2006) [http://www.uceps.org/additional/NSD79\\_eng.pdf](http://www.uceps.org/additional/NSD79_eng.pdf) [accessed January 15, 2007]. The regional division of Ukraine is as follows: the West – Volyn, Transcarpathian, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi regions; the South: the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Kherson regions; the Centre: Kyiv city, Vinnytsya, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions; the East: Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhya, Luhansk, Kharkiv regions.

What differentiates PfP from ENP is that in principle all PfP countries have the possibility to become a NATO member if they qualify, while some of the ENP countries (the Mediterranean states) cannot become an EU member, even if they comply with the whole set of EU rules.

Many accounts of NATO's socialization policy highlight the achievements of PfP's persuasive power. There are several reasons for this. First, the specific focus of NATO's efforts predominantly on the defense and security sector allows it to narrow the target area of interest and to direct more human and financial resources on a particular target group. This is much more difficult to do for the EU, because it engages simultaneously in a multitude of issue-areas and must thus focus on many more target groups.

Several authors suggest that the socializing effects can be well observed in case of a military community – a powerful group of the society. Pevehouse, for example, mentions that “security-oriented organizations” may help to ‘democratize’ [the] military, which, similarly to business elites, is a very powerful actor.<sup>255</sup> In addition to providing the “externally supported guarantees,” security-oriented IOs help to “reorient military officers away from interest in domestic politics.”<sup>256</sup> By developing modern military forces, states are allocating resources which in turn ensure the institutional protection of militaries. All together, these actions contribute to a successful overall transition process.

It also has to be mentioned that the socialization of the military has direct repercussions on domestic society in general. Through a wide range of instruments, NATO contributes to the socialization of military leaders in explaining their role in a democratic society. In addition, the military elites from the partner countries interact not only with their counterparts from the Member States, but also with the military elites from other partner countries. Thus, it may be argued that observation of the positive changes realized by some partners may have an important impact on beliefs and identity and may inspire emulation. To some degree, the democratic rules and conditions of IOs

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<sup>255</sup> Jon C. Pevehouse, “Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization,” *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 527.

<sup>256</sup> Ibid.

in terms of domestic control of the Armed Forces may be accepted even by the military elites from the authoritarian states. Consequently, they become “more likely to accept full democracy.”<sup>257</sup>

The new ideas and identities institutionalized within the militaries have a positive effect on their society which begins to perceive its Armed Forces not only as a defender of the country, but also as a contributor to international peace and security. For example, there is no doubt that participation of military contingents in NATO/PfP exercises or other multinational training activities positively echoes within the society. Therefore, the population would rather welcome and support, as a matter of pride, its national military forces that are capable to contribute to international efforts of maintaining security.

It can be argued that the organization of such PfP events in a partner country may have a powerful socializing effect. Thus, for example, it is difficult to underestimate the socializing effect that the exercises hosted for the first time by Moldova in 2006 had on public opinion.<sup>258</sup> Ukraine has had a much more profound experience of hosting NATO/PfP exercises already since 1996. In the last decade Ukraine has hosted over 30 multinational exercises.<sup>259</sup> But along with this positive socialization, such efforts can also become counterproductive and may spur anti-NATO forces, as happened in 2006 in Ukraine.

In sum, this subchapter pointed out that the intense process of communication between NATO and partners within the PfP framework contributes to a common interpretation of norms and rules, thus increasing the level of cultural match. Through the gradual development of shared identities, the establishment of “many-sided and direct relations among the states and their societies,” as well as through the establishment of democratic institutions, NATO creates conditions for the diffusion of liberal norms and

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<sup>257</sup> Pevehouse, “Democracy from the Outside-In,” 528.

<sup>258</sup> In September 2006 Moldova hosted a combined NATO/PfP exercise “Cooperative Longbow/Cooperative Lancer”.

<sup>259</sup> Data from the official site of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense <http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=cooperation&sub=participation> [accessed January 17, 2007].

values, though we have little proof of the effectiveness of these tools.<sup>260</sup> The Alliance's policies based on persuasion and social learning, rather than on 'hard' conditionality, and the wide spectrum of educational activities proposed within the PfP, seems to be more efficient in socializing the elites of the PfP countries. Therefore, NATO's socialization strategies appear to be conducive in motivating domestic actors in partner states to comply with the norms diffused by the Alliance.

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<sup>260</sup> Lucarelli, "NATO and the European System," 102.

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## **V. COMPARING THE SOCIALIZING STRATEGIES**

This chapter will summarize the analysis of the socialization strategies applied by the EU and NATO to partners that do not have membership perspectives. In particular, it will focus on the main achievements and shortcomings of the ENP and PfP, with specific emphasis on those elements which affect the compliance with norms in Eastern Europe. The data will be incorporated in a matrix. Finally, the chapter will present some recommendations and discuss about the way forward.

### **A. THE RATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE**

Despite the evident reliance of the EU on the rationalist strategy, the ENP appears to be less effective as a socialization mechanism if compared with NATO. A general distinguishing characteristic between the socialization strategies of the EU and of NATO is that the former has built its partnership policy on ‘hard’ conditionality, while the latter has applied a multi-level conditionality that is ‘tailor-made’ according to partner aspirations. This may be explained by the way in which each organization has approached the partnership issue. The ENP was structured along the EU’s enlargement ‘model’. It inherited the strong ‘demand’ side of the process, while offering relatively weak rewards.

NATO approached the enlargement process differently. Facing new challenges in the post-Cold War period, the Alliance initiated a gradual rapprochement with the former ‘enemies’, transforming them step-by-step into ‘partners’, some of them later into members, and developing a new partnership framework that allows for a smooth transition from partnership to membership.

Another general observation is that the EU has a formalized set of rules (“Copenhagen Criteria”) that the candidates have to comply with before they are accepted to the organization. In contrast, NATO does not have such fixed and rigid conditions for accession and, besides demanding general adherence to democratic norms and principles,

requests from future members' specifically only a contribution to collective defense and to the Alliance's missions.

## **1. Determinacy of Conditions**

The research has pointed out that in terms of determinacy of conditions the PfP is more effective than the ENP in motivating the domestic actors of the target governments to comply with its demands. This may be explained by at least two reasons. First, the ENP covers a broader range of issue-areas. It is an advantage and a disadvantage at the same time. It is an advantage because the socialization process affects the target country in its entirety. It is a disadvantage because of the challenge faced by the target country that needs to tackle transformations in several areas simultaneously.

Second, the EU can not demand from the ENP countries full compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria since it does not offer the membership perspective. Therefore, the reference to a vaguer term, "European standards," leaves sometimes the domestic actors guessing what exactly should be undertaken. In addition, the thesis revealed that the ENP Action Plans are hardly seen as "real incentives for reform" because of too long lists of "priorities of actions" and things "to do." The "benefits the ENP offers in response to compliance with EU rules are predominantly long-term and vague"<sup>261</sup> and are not connected to fulfillment of the objectives or even the most important priorities.

In this respect, NATO's demands are more precise because they focus on a more limited range of issues (mostly on the defense and security sector and military capabilities of the partner countries). Besides, the tailor-made conditionality of the PfP and the variety of instruments and tools provided by the Program allows NATO to advance more concrete demands as the partner country intensifies its cooperation with the Alliance. The PfP framework also provides effective instruments that offer clear guidelines for reforms (Partnership Goals, STANAGs and APs). They are based on

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<sup>261</sup> Sergiu Panainte, "How to Deal with Future Neighbors? – The European Neighborhood Policy: The Case of Moldova," in "Socializing Strategies and Their Application: The Case of Moldova," Krystyna Kwarciak and Sergiu Panainte, Central European University, Working Paper 4/06 (2006): 30, <http://www.ceu.hu/cens/assets/files/moldova> [accessed December 12, 2006].

commonly elaborated documents – NATO standards – and indicate not only the final goal to be achieved, but also the way how to accomplish it.

## **2. Size and Speed of Rewards**

The research suggested that from the perspective of the size and speed of rewards, NATO's Partnership policy is more conducive to compliance with the Alliance's norms than the ENP, though the picture is more mixed here. The main reward that the EU and NATO can offer is the membership perspective. As this thesis pointed out, neither the ENP nor the PfP offer such a perspective. However, there are two explanations why NATO's policy seems to be more promising than the EU's. First, NATO permanently emphasizes its openness for new members, while the EU has reached an "enlargement fatigue" which signals both a reluctance to extend further invitations and, consequently, a pause in the enlargement process for an undetermined period of time. Second, NATO officially approaches the PfP as a preparatory stage for future members. The Partnership instruments and tools are directed towards gradual improvement of the structures and capabilities of those partners who wish to join the Alliance. In contrast, the EU does not attribute the same quality to the ENP, insisting on a clear distinction between the ENP and future membership.

In terms of quantity of rewards, the ENP has potential advantages. Due to its wide scope, the EU can offer a broader range of incentives than NATO. In addition, the EU's incentives are more attractive (financial aid, access to EU Internal Market, integration into the EU institutions, freedom of movement, etc.) and affect the entire society in partner countries. In the meantime, for the same reasons, delivering upon these incentives is much more complex and problematic. Their repercussions on EU structures and policies are much higher because they involve such critical areas as the EU's economy (access on Internal Market), budget (financial aid), internal security (freedom of movement) and labor markets (migration of labor into the EU).

It is true that the EU takes a more positive attitude when it comes to assist the candidate countries. The soon-to-be-members benefit from the entire spectrum of the EU's potential and in this respect the EU's socialization effect is higher than that of



NATO. In this context, the problem seems to be not the availability of ‘carrots’ but the EU Member States’ unwillingness to employ them with regard to the ENP countries.

In contrast to the EU, NATO has succeeded in effectively realizing the limited set of incentives it can offer. Basically, the best that NATO can offer to partners is their integration in the NATO/PfP structures. This incentive has a huge positive effect on both sides of the process. For NATO, the direct link between the Alliance and the partners (through PCC) ensures effective cooperation and provides valuable input from partners while elaborating its initiatives within PfP. Concerning PSEs, NATO benefits by saving resources and, through intense communication, speeding up the process of socialization. On the other side, for partners this is a possibility to become part of the NATO/PfP ‘kitchen’ and an opportunity to directly influence NATO’s PfP policy. In general, from the point of view of socialization, the intensive integration of the PfP elements in the NATO HQs is useful because it involves a level of implicit conditionality, since the candidates for the NATO/PfP positions must correspond to NATO standards.

### **3. Credibility of Conditions**

This research has demonstrated that the EU conditionality is less credible, basically because the promised rewards are not always delivered in practice. In addition, the composition of the ENP itself also does not add too much to the credibility of the EU intentions. The same conditionality is applied to a group of highly heterogeneous countries with different interests and perspectives of membership. It is hardly conceivable that such a policy leads to substantial compliance among the potential candidates (Eastern Europe). Thus, the reluctance of the EU to somehow reflect the distinct status of the East European neighbors in ENP has a negative effect on the ENP’s credibility. NATO’s PfP is also characterized by a heterogeneous composition. However, it allows for differentiation and, thus, is reactive to the partners’ performances.

This thesis has pointed out that an IO’s policy is more credible when it is backed by all its members. The example of the ENP shows that the EU Member States’ interests and approaches towards the neighbors diverge. It is especially important that the ‘old’ EU members (i.e., Germany and France) can not even agree which countries should be

accorded priority. The lack of a unified approach and, moreover, the diverging interests of the key players in the EU significantly undermine the overall credibility of the ENP. The situation is worsened by the specifics of EU governance in foreign policy which is still basically intergovernmental.

In the same context, NATO's enlargement and partnership policy appears more consequential due to the leading role of the United States, who, since 1993/94, is the main proponent of the organization's enlargement. Since then, the US has been using its 'power' to convince doubting members about the benefits of enlargement and is strongly supporting those partners that express their wish to join NATO. The American political support of partners, combined with the financial assistance, increases the credibility of the PfP.

However, the existence of a hegemon within an IO also has a negative side. Shifts in US priorities, like after 9/11, may have immediate repercussions on the entire policy of an IO. Thus, as mentioned by Kamp, due to the current challenges faced by NATO, the US becomes more interested in those partners who can actively contribute to military operations and to the GWT.<sup>262</sup> Therefore, its main assistance is directed to those PfP countries which express an interest to join the Alliance. In parallel, the US Administration develops alternatives to PfP, in particular the global partnership with so-called "non-NATO nations."<sup>263</sup>

How can this affect the PfP countries? First, the US encourages 'active' participation, so those 'moderate' or 'passive' partners may remain beyond the US 'horizon' and receive less American attention and support. Second, in general the shift of US interests and resources to alternative partnerships may diminish the credibility of the PfP as a whole. Thus, the 'moderate' partners (i.e., Moldova) might have to review their policy and to aspire for NATO membership.

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<sup>262</sup> Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Global Partnership: A New Conflict Within NATO?" (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung publication) no. 29 (May 2006)  
[http://www.kas.de/db\\_files/dokumente/veranstaltungsbeitraege/7\\_dokument\\_dok\\_pdf\\_9491\\_2.pdf](http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/veranstaltungsbeitraege/7_dokument_dok_pdf_9491_2.pdf)  
[accessed January 15, 2007].

<sup>263</sup> GWT - Global War on Terrorism.

#### **4. Veto Players and Adoption Costs**

The analysis has demonstrated that the impact of this factor on the level of compliance of the target governments depends on the type of strategy used by the IO. In relations with its neighbors the EU predominantly applies the exclusive strategy, while NATO's PfP is more inclusive. On the one hand, the case of Belarus has demonstrated that due to the high adoption costs the application of the EU's exclusive strategy is not necessarily effective and does not guarantee that the 'punished' country will change its policy. In the meantime, the exclusion from cooperation reduces the communication and contacts with the societal groups of this country. Thus, the socialization effect is practically missing where it might be needed most.

On the other hand, PfP's 'inclusiveness' of non-democratic regimes, though it contravenes basic principles and norms of the international community, still furthers the socialization process in that particular country. If the connections between a particular country and the IO are maintained, the socialization process (even if it goes slowly) still allows the norm entrepreneurs to build domestic organizational frameworks and internalize the new norms. Thus, the perspective of a government's compliance with the IO's norms is higher. What is remarkable for the PfP is that its framework offers to domestic players more room of 'maneuver' in defining the level of cooperation with the minimum adoption costs.

Another argument of this thesis is that for the East European governments the domestic costs of compliance with the EU and NATO rules depend mostly on an external player – Russia. The recent conflict between Russia and Georgia has been a 'showcase' for the 'near abroad', demonstrating how far the Russian authorities may go and how strongly they may punish local governments who are trying to re-orient their foreign policies and 'escape' from Russian influence. Thus, in order to increase the effectiveness of their socialization processes the EU and NATO should be stricter in demanding from Russia the same level of compliance with democratic norms and rules as they do with regard to other partners. However, it should be emphasized that the academic literature focuses predominantly on domestic veto players and lacks studies on the impact of

external players on domestic adoption costs. The topic, especially the domestic level-international level nexus of veto players, needs further research.

## **B. THE CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE**

This study has revealed serious problems in applying the constructivist perspective in measuring the effectiveness of a socialization policy. First of all, different factors legitimacy, identity and resonance are highly interrelated and would be difficult to analyze separately. Second, it is difficult to depict the cause-effect relation when these factors are considered. For example, there is no doubt that the identification of the target governments with the IO is crucial for the success of the socialization process. However, the socialization strategy itself affects the target country's identity and, insofar, shapes the preferences of the decision-makers. Bidirectional causality is hardly measurable since you cannot hold one factor constant. Therefore, it is sometimes difficult to determine which factor is decisive for the socialization outcome. Finally, for a more systematic analysis, the constructivist factors would need clearer definitions in order to delineate them more precisely.

Nevertheless, based on the research findings, the ENP seems to be less effective applying the constructivist perspective. Despite the fact that the formal documents foresee various initiatives based on persuasion and social learning, most of them are still not realized in practice. Vice versa, persuasion and social learning are the key elements of the PfP success. A brief review of the main factors will confirm this.

### **1. Legitimacy**

In general terms the legitimacy of rules and demands of both organizations is undisputable since the EU and NATO represent the international community and its democratic norms and values. Thus, the IOs' demands to undertake democratic transformation are, basically, accepted in target countries, sometimes even more by the populations than by governments. However, difficulties arise when it comes to concrete mechanisms and particular demands. In this regard, as argued in this study, the ENP demands have a 'mixed' legitimacy among the domestic actors of targeted countries, for

reasons already mentioned in this chapter: unclear priorities and actions in the Action Plans; disputable balance of the obligations and commitments between the EU and partners; 'unfairness' of the rule-adoption process. But the main cause of the ENP's weakness is the lacking balance between strong demands and weak rewards.

In the meantime, NATO's demands are fewer in number, but are perceived as more legitimate for at least two reasons. First, they focus on the defense and security sector, which is of critical importance for any independent state; and second, they help partners to practically realize their commitments in contributing to international peace and security. Besides, as previously stated, the flexibility of PfP's framework allows a partner to restrict cooperation to a level where the Alliance's demands are perceived as legitimate and right.

## **2. Identity**

The identification of the domestic actors with the IOs facilitates the compliance with the IOs rules. This factor is interrelated with the previous one and, basically, determines the level of legitimacy of process and rules. This thesis has argued that both the ENP and PfP are heterogeneous in terms of the identity of their members. However, hypothetically all the PfP members may join NATO, while the EU is practically 'closed' for Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries. In this regard, NATO's policy is more differentiated by establishing separate partnerships with these regions, aiming at their gradual approach to the Alliance.

Another observation of this research is that NATO's Partnership policy, based on intensive communication, training and education, makes the PfP an effective socialization mechanism. Its instruments are equally directed towards both the elites and the population, while the ENP's programs (as far as they are already implemented) are primarily geared towards decision-makers. The 'epistemic communities' created by NATO in the target countries act as powerful agents of socialization and at the same time contribute to the formation of efficient organizational platforms. Thus, socialization is possible even in countries with no accession aspirations. In this respect, the EU initiatives are sometimes absent or are not realized in practice.

Referring to the identity issue in Moldova and Ukraine, it should be mentioned that although pro-EU and pro-NATO sentiments are prevailing in both countries, there is still a split in societal preferences in terms of foreign policy orientations. However, in Moldova the pro-European orientation and intensified cooperation with NATO promoted by the government are basically supported by the population. In Ukraine the situation is more complicated, especially with regard to the country's integration in NATO. The analysis has revealed a significant gap between the preferences of the elites (President versus government and parliament) as well as among the population (Western regions versus the rest of the country). This may be explained by the fact that NATO is still perceived by the majority of the Ukrainian population as a 'hostile' military Alliance and these sentiments are supported by the advocates of 'Eastern' (pro-Russian) orientation. Nevertheless, despite such big divergences the Ukrainian government continues to prepare the country for NATO membership and, significantly, the PfP framework is supportive in this sense.

### **3. Resonance**

The last, but definitely not the least important factor of the socialization process can not be perceived in isolation of the previous two, and it affects the compliance with the IO's norm in the same manner as identity and legitimacy do. As previously stated, one of the ENP weaknesses is the fact that in the same 'basket' are gathered countries which have little cultural match with the EU. The other problem is that the persuasive power of the ENP has not been used at its potential level despite the fact that the ENP framework practically affects the entire society in the target countries. Therefore, from this point of view, it can be also considered that the PfP proved to be the more efficient socializing mechanism.

The main findings of the previous analysis are reflected in Table 7.

Table 7. Overview of Case Study Conditions and Results (with focus on Eastern Europe)

Influential factors		EU (ENP)	NATO (PfP)
Rationalist perspective (External incentives model)	General	Based on enlargement experience 'Hard' conditionality <i>Acquis Communautaire</i>	Preceded the enlargement policy 'Multi-level' conditionality No fixed, rigid rules
	Determinacy of conditions	Broad range of issue-areas Vague terms ("European standards") Low specification of priorities, tasks and partners' commitments, weak guidance for reforms (ENP Action Plan)	Narrow focus on defense and security Official NATO standards (STANAGs) Specified objectives, timeline and partners' and NATO's commitments, clear guidance ("Partnership Goals", PARP, IPAP)
	Size and speed of rewards	"Enlargement fatigue" No link between ENP and membership Numerous 'attractive' incentives No integration	"Open door policy" "Through PfP to membership" Limited number of incentives Integration of partners (NMR, PCC, PSE)
	Credibility of conditionality	Rewards promised, but not realized 'One size fit all' approach Divergences within the EU – no protagonist	Promises delivered Conditions adapted to partners' ambitions The US leading role
	Veto players and adoption costs	Exclusive (Belarus, Libya) High adoption costs for authoritarian regimes Russian countervailing factor (moderate)	Generally inclusive Low adoption costs for the non-democratic regimes Russian countervailing factor (strong)
Constructivist perspective (Social learning model)	General	Weak reliance on social learning and persuasion	Strong reliance on social learning and persuasion
	Legitimacy of norms and process	Mixed legitimacy	High legitimacy
	Identity	'Heterogeneity' of partners (negative) No special status for Ukraine Sketchy transactions Lack of training and education Lack of "epistemic communities"	'Heterogeneity' of partners (positive) Special status for Ukraine Intensive transactions (communication) Emphasis on training and education Existent "epistemic communities"

	Resonance	Cultural match (0) – one ‘basket’ for all Broad range of targeted social groups Weak counterattitudinal groups	Cultural match (+) – PpP, MD, ICI Narrow range of targeted social groups Strong counterattitudinal group
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In summary, to date the EU’s socialization strategy with regard to Eastern European countries is less effective than that of NATO. Nevertheless, realizing the shortcomings of the ENP and responding to the insistence of the Eastern neighbors, the EU is undertaking practical steps in order to increase the effectiveness of the ENP. Thus, at the end of 2006 a set of new initiatives was proposed. According to those initiatives, the EU focuses its attention on more practical steps to further enhance the economic and trade component; to facilitate the mobility and management of migration; to promote people-to-people exchanges; to build a thematic dimension to the ENP; and to strengthen political, regional and financial cooperation between the EU and ENP counties.<sup>264</sup> Moreover, the development of the ENP is among the priorities of the EU policy in 2007,<sup>265</sup> also reflected in the German EU Presidency’s program for the first semester.

Some concrete steps have already been taken by the EU. Thus, the substantial increase of the financial assistance to Moldova,<sup>266</sup> the initiation of the discussion between the EU and Ukraine on a more enhanced cooperation<sup>267</sup> and the progress in negotiations

<sup>264</sup> “On Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy,” Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament” (COM(2006)726 final), Brussels, December 4, 2006 [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com06\\_726\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com06_726_en.pdf) [accessed December 4, 2006].

<sup>265</sup> Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy – Speaking Points,” Press conference at Brussels, December 4, 2006 <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/778&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> [accessed December 12, 2006].

<sup>266</sup> “European Commission Announces Substantial Increase in Financial Assistance to the Republic of Moldova,” Press release from Brussels, December 12, 2006 <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1754&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> [accessed December 12, 2006].

<sup>267</sup> “EU-Ukraine Start Negotiations on New Enhanced Agreement,” Press release, March 2, 2007 <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/275&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> [accessed March 13, 2007].



on the visa regime and preferential trade demonstrate the EU's intentions to become a strong normative power by making the ENP a more efficient norm diffusion mechanism.

Concluding the research, it should be pointed out that the validity of the claims made in this analysis may be arguable due to the specificity of comparison between the ENP and PfP. First, NATO's Partnership policy was initiated in 1991. In more than ten years it has reached a degree of maturity which the still-emerging and much younger ENP has not attained as yet. Looking back at the evolution of PfP, it can be assumed that the ENP will also gain more socializing power. Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand why the EU did not rely on NATO's rich experience in dealing with partners and did not adapt the successful PfP instruments to the Neighborhood Policy. It is further proof of a lacking culture of open dialogue and deliberation between NATO and the EU that NATO General Secretary de Hoop Scheffer recently himself alluded to.<sup>268</sup> There is no transfer of experience from PfP to ENP, although both processes are mutually reinforcing, and the detrimental repercussions in terms of socialization are evident.

Second, the PfP is specifically attractive for those countries that wish to join NATO and have an accession perspective. Thus, partnership and membership perspective reinforce one another. For the ENP, partnership and accession perspective are clearly separated. The negative consequences of separation of both processes in terms of motivation to reform are obvious and might lead the EU to rethink this basic tenet of its ENP.

Finally, the arguments of this thesis apply mainly to the relationship of both organizations with the countries that have no membership perspectives. When referring to the enlargement, the EU possibilities in terms of rewards are much higher than those of NATO. Thus, its policy is more attractive and the socializing effect is more powerful.

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<sup>268</sup> "NATO and the EU: Time for a New Chapter," Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Berlin (Germany), January 29, 2007  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070129b.html> [accessed February 20, 2007].

## VI. CONCLUSION

Global norms, values and rules spread by IOs affect decision-makers' choices of domestic and foreign policies. However, the success of norm diffusion is not self-evident. It depends on the combination of several factors, such as the attractiveness and credibility of rewards and incentives offered by the IOs to target countries; the domestic costs of compliance with the IOs' norms; the legitimacy of the IOs' norms and rules; and the cultural match between the IOs and domestic societal actors in their reforms.

This thesis has evaluated the process of norm diffusion by two International Organizations. It has demonstrated that for both cases enlargement is the main mechanism of norm diffusion in Eastern Europe. But, since the enlargement process depends on the IO's readiness and integration capacity, the organization may also diffuse its norms through partnerships with states with a vague or non-existent membership perspective.

In this context, the research has focused on the effectiveness of the socialization strategies applied by the EU and NATO towards the countries that presently do not have a membership perspective. This study's main argument is that despite all positive achievements to date, the EU's socialization mechanism – the ENP – seems to be less effective when compared to the PfP. Although both programs do not promise future membership, the PfP tools offer more flexibility, determinacy and attractiveness to partner countries' governments. NATO's policy is more motivational in terms of compliance with the Western community norms and better contributes to the promotion of the necessary reforms. The EU's policy towards its neighbors suffers from a number of shortcomings, the main ones being: the low credibility and the vagueness of rewards and incentives; the heterogeneity of the ENP countries; the lack of clear guidance in the Action Plans; and the differences that still persist among the EU members over the neighborhood policy.

Although the EU disposes of more options for an effective socialization process, it does not yet realize its potential in practice. Therefore, in order to achieve the real value

of ENP, the EU leadership should focus on practical realization of its intentions. At the same time, the ENP should differentiate more among countries with no membership perspective (Mediterranean, Central Asia) and countries with potential membership perspective (Eastern Europe), recognizing that today's policy has a serious impact on domestic reforms and thus future perspectives. Socialization does not start with accession talks. The groundwork is laid much earlier – and ENP is the mechanism to do so.

Finally, this research has discovered several shortcomings in the theoretical field. In particular, it has pointed out several ambiguities in measuring the effectiveness of the socialization policies from the constructivist perspective, which in itself has proved to be indeed relevant. Future studies should focus both on refining the theoretical concepts, specifically by coming up with less ambiguous and overlapping definitions of key categories like identity, reputation or legitimacy, and on devising more specific guidelines of how to measure the effectiveness of norm diffusion through operationalization of the constructivist factors. In that sense, this thesis might have contributed to highlighting some empirical as well as theoretical desiderata that need to be tackled in future research.

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